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This paper introduces negotiations, a model of concurrency close to Petri
nets, with multi-party negotiations as concurrency primitive. We study two
fundamental analysis problems. The soundness problem consists of deciding
if it is always possible for a negotiation to terminate successfully, whatever
the current state is. Given a sound negotiation, the summarization prob-
lem aims at computing an equivalent one-step negotiation with the same
input/output behavior. The soundness and summarization problems can be
solved by means of simple algorithms acting on the state space of the negoti-
ation, which however face the well-known state explosion problem. We study
alternative algorithms that avoid the construction of the state space. In par-
ticular, we define reduction rules that simplify a negotiation while preserving
the sound/non-sound character of the negotiation and its summary. In a first
result we show that our rules are complete for the class of weakly determin-
istic acyclic negotiations, meaning that they reduce all sound negotiations in
this class, and only them, to equivalent one-step negotiations. This provides
algorithms for both the soundness and summarization problems that avoid
the construction of the state space. We then study the class of deterministic
negotiations. Our second main result shows that the rules are also complete
for this class, even if the negotiation contains cycles. Moreover, we present
an algorithm that completely reduces all sound deterministic negotiations,
and only them, in polynomial time.
∗This work was partially supported by the Graduiertenkolleg 1480 PUMA and the project “Negotia-
tions: A Model of Tractable Concurrency,” both funded by the German Research Council, and by
the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Technical University of Munich.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
07
91
2v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  2
3 D
ec
 20
16
1. Introduction
Negotiation has long been identified as a paradigm for process interaction [DS83]. It
has been applied to different problems (see e.g. [WSJ00, AAS00]), and studied on its
own [JFL+01]. The purpose of this paper is to initiate the study of negotiations from a
concurrency-theoretic, observational point of view. Observationally, a negotiation is an
interaction in which several partners come together to agree on one out of a number of
possible outcomes (a synchronized nondeterministic choice). While such an interaction
can be modelled in any standard process algebra as a combination of parallel composition
and nondeterministic choice, or as a small Petri net, we argue that much can be gained by
studying formal models with atomic negotiation as concurrency primitive. In particular,
we show that the negotiation point of view reveals new classes of systems with polynomial
analysis algorithms.
Atomic negotiations can be combined into distributed negotiations. For example, a
distributed negotiation between a buyer, a seller, and a broker consists of one or more
rounds of atomic negotiations involving the buyer and the broker, or the seller and the
broker, followed by a concluding atomic negotiation between the buyer and the seller.
We introduce a formal model for distributed negotiations, inspired by van der Aalst’s
workflow Petri nets [dA98]. A negotiation atom, or just atom, involves a set of parties
(for instance, buyer and broker), and has a set of possible outcomes (for example, buy and
sell). Each party has a set of possible internal states, and each outcome has associated a
state-transformer; if the parties agree on a given outcome, then its associated transformer
determines the possible “exit states” of the parties after executing the atom as a function
of their “entry states” before executing the atom. Atoms are combined into distributed
negotiations, by means of a next-atoms function that determines for each atom, each
party, and each outcome, the set of atoms the party is ready to engage in next if the
atomic negotiation ends with that outcome. We assume that a distributed negotiation
always starts with an initial atom and ends with a final atom, both of which involve all
parties of the complete distributed negotiation.
Like workflow nets, distributed negotiations can be unsound because of deadlocks or
livelocks. The soundness problem consists of deciding if a given negotiation is sound.
Further, a sound negotiation is equivalent to one single atom whose state-transformer
determines the possible final internal states of all parties as a function of their initial
internal states. The summarization problem consists of computing such an atomic ne-
gotiation, called a summary. The set of reachable global states can be finite or infinite
because each party can have infinitely many internal states. If it is finite, then the
soundness and summarization problems can be solved by means of well-known algo-
rithms based on the exhaustive exploration of the state space. However, this approach
badly suffers from the state-explosion problem: the state-space of distributed negotia-
tions grows exponentially in the size of the negotiation itself, even if all atoms had only
one single local state.
In this paper we first show that the state-explosion problem cannot be avoided in full
generality, because the soundness problem is PSPACE-complete for arbitrary negotia-
tions, and a decision problem related to the summarization problem is PSPACE-complete
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even for negotiations in which each party has only two internal states. We then pro-
vide reduction algorithms for the soundness and summarization problems. Reduction
algorithms exhaustively apply syntactic reduction rules that simplify the system while
preserving some aspects of the behavior, like absence of deadlocks. The rules are ex-
haustively applied, until the system is either a trivial one, or a non-trivial system, but
with a smaller state space. This approach has been extensively applied to Petri nets
and workflow nets, but most of this work has been devoted to the liveness or soundness
problems [Ber86, Had88, HPP06]. For these problems many reduction rules are known,
and they have been proved complete for certain classes of systems [GT84, Des92, DE95],
meaning that they reduce all live or sound systems in the class, and only those, to a triv-
ial system (in our case, to a single atom). However, many of these rules, like the linear
dependency rule of [DE95], cannot be applied to the summarization problem, because
they do not preserve the summary, only the soundness property.
We provide a solution to the summarization problem for deterministic negotiations,
based on a complete set of reduction rules. In deterministic negotiations all involved
agents are deterministic, meaning that they are never ready to engage in more than one
atomic negotiation. We provide a reduction strategy guaranteeing that a sound deter-
ministic negotiation will be summarized by means of a polynomial number of applications
of the rules.
Intuitively, nondeterministic agents may be ready to engage in several atomic nego-
tiations, and which one takes place is decided by the deterministic parties, which play
thus the role of negotiation leaders. We also introduce weakly deterministic negotiations
(roughly speaking, in weakly deterministic negotiations, each atomic negotiation has a
deterministic party), and provide a complete set of reduction rules for acyclic weakly
deterministic negotiations.
This paper is the definitive version of the results presented in [ED13, ED14]. It con-
tains detailed proofs of all theorems. In particular, it corrects an error of the algorithm
of [ED14], which in a certain special case might not terminate. We also conduct a better
complexity analysis, leading to an algorithm of cubic complexity, instead of the O(n4)
analysis of [ED14].
Related work. Specific distributed negotiation protocols have been modeled with the
help of Petri nets or process calculi (see e.g. [SFC04, JTL05, BMMvdA11, Cap12]).
However, these papers do not address the issue of negotiation as concurrency primitive.
The reduction rules introduced in Petri net theory by Berthelot and Haddad [Ber86,
Had88] have more recently been applied to the analysis of workflow nets in [DvdAV05,
VWvdAtH10]. These works do not address completeness issues. Complete rule sets have
been proposed for several Petri net classes [GT84, Des92, DE95]. However, the rules only
preserve a property close to soundness, and so cannot be used for summarization.
Applications. In work published after [ED13, ED14] we have applied the reduction
algorithms of this paper to the analysis of workflow Petri nets. Deterministic negotiations
are very tightly related to free-choice workflow nets [DE15], and the reduction algorithms
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can be adapted. In [EH16] we report on experimental results on the analysis of a
collection of almost 2000 workflows from industrial sources.
Structure. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the syntax and
semantics of negotiations, and the classes of deterministic and weakly deterministic ne-
gotiations. Section 3 presents the soundness and summarization problems, and analyzes
their computational complexity. Section 4 introduces our set of reduction rules. The rest
of the paper presents completeness and complexity results of our set of rules. Section 5
studies acyclic negotiations. It shows that our rules summarize all sound and acyclic
weakly-deterministic negotiations, and presents a simple reduction strategy that reduces
all acyclic sound deterministic negotiations in polynomial time. Sections 6 and 7 present
the main result of the paper: a polynomial reduction algorithm for arbitrary determin-
istic negotiations. Several lengthy proofs are containd in a number of appendices.
2. Negotiations: Syntax and Semantics
We fix a finite set A of agents representing potential parties of negotiations. Each agent
p ∈ A has a (possibly infinite) nonempty set Qp of internal states. We denote by QA
the cartesian product
∏
p∈AQp, for a subset P ⊆ A we similarly define QP =
∏
p∈P Qp.
A transformer is a left-total relation τ ⊆ QA × QA, representing a nondetermin-
istic state transforming function. Given P ⊆ A, we say that a transformer τ is a
P -transformer if, for each pi /∈ P ,
(
(qp1 , . . . , qpi , . . . , qp|A|), (q
′
p1 , . . . , q
′
pi , . . . , q
′
p|A|)
)
∈ τ
implies qpi = q
′
pi . This means that a P -transformer only transforms the internal states
of agents in P .
Definition 1. A negotiation atom, or just an atom, is a triple n = (Pn, Rn, δn), where
Pn ⊆ A is a nonempty set of parties, Rn is a finite, nonempty set of results, and δn
is a mapping assigning to each result r in Rn a Pn-transformer δn(r). For each result
r ∈ Rn, we call the pair (n, r) an outcome.
Intuitively, if the respective states of the agents before an atom n are given by a tuple
q and the result of the negotiation is r, then the agents change their states to another
tuple q′ for some (q, q′) ∈ δn(r).
For a simple example, consider a negotiation atom n with parties F (Father) and
D (teenage Daughter). The goal of the negotiation is to determine whether D can go
to a party, and the time at which she must return home. The possible results are
{yes, no, ask mother}. Both sets QF and QD contain a state angry plus a state t for
every time T1 ≤ t ≤ T2 in a given interval [T1, T2] (we assume that the time values are
appropriately ordered, choose for example {9, 10, 11, 12}). Initially, F is in state tf and
D in state td.
If the state of F or of D is angry, then both will be angry after negotiating, no
matter what the result of the negotiation atom is. The remaining transformations of the
mapping δn are given by
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δn(yes) ⊃ {((tf , td), (t, t)) | tf ≤ t ≤ td ∨ td ≤ t ≤ tf}
δn(no) ⊃ {((tf , td), (angry , angry)) }
δn(ask mother) ⊃ {((tf , td), (tf , td))}
That is, if the result is yes, then F and D agree on a time t which is not earlier and not
later than both suggested times. If it is no, then there is a quarrel and both parties get
angry. If the result is ask mother, then the parties keep their previous times.
2.1. Combining Atomic Negotiations
A negotiation is a composition of atoms. We add a transition function X that assigns
to every triple (n, p, r) consisting of an atom n, a participant p of n, and a result r of
n a set X(n, p, r) of atoms. Intuitively, this is the set of atomic negotiations agent p is
ready to engage in after the atom n, if the result of n is r.
Negotiations can be graphically represented as shown in Figure 1 (ignore the black
dots on the arrows for now). For each atom n ∈ N we draw a black bar; for each party
p ∈ Pn we draw a white circle on the bar, called a port. For each triple (n, p, r), we draw
a hyperarc leading from the port of p in n to all the ports of p in the atoms of X(n, p, r),
and label it by r. (If X(n, p, r) contains only one atom, then the hyperarc is actually
an arc.) If X(n, p, r) = X(n, p, r′), i.e., if the next possible atoms of an agent p after the
negotiation atom n are the same for two results r and r′, then we draw a single hyperarc
and label it by r and r′, and similarly for more than two results. In later examples, we
omit the labels whenever we are only interested in the structure of the negotiation.
F D Mn0
F Dn1
D Mn2
F D Mnf
st st st
y,n,am
am
y,n
y,n y,n
F D Mn0
F Dn1
F D Mn2
F D Mnf
y y y
tm tm
y y y
n n n
r r r
Figure 1: Two negotiations between three agents.
Figure 1 shows two Father-Daughter-Mother negotiations, omitting, for the sake of
brevity, the state transformers associated to the results. On the left, after an ini-
tial atomic negotiation n0 involving all three agents, Daughter and Father negotiate
(atom n1) with possible results yes (y), no (n), and ask mother (am). If the result is
ask mother, then Daughter and Mother negotiate (atom n2) with possible results yes
and no. The negotiation ends with a final atom nf
5
In the negotiation on the right, Father, Daughter and Mother initially negotiate with
possible results yes and no. If the result is yes, then Father and Daughter negotiate a
time for the Daughter to return home (atom n1) and propose it to Mother (atom n2). If
Mother approves (result yes), then the negotiation terminates with nf , otherwise (result
r) Daughter and Father renegotiate the time.
Before defining negotiations, we need a more general structure that we call pre-
negotiation:
Definition 2. Given a finite set of atoms N , let T (N) denote the set of triples (n, p, r)
such that n ∈ N , p ∈ Pn, and r ∈ Rn. A pre-negotiation is a tuple N = (N,n0, nf ,X),
where n0, nf ∈ N are the initial atom and the final atom, and X : T (N) → 2N is the
transition function.
Abstracting from ports leads to the notion of graph of a pre-negotiation:
Definition 3. Let N = (N,n0, nf ,X) be a pre-negotiation. The graph of N is the
directed graph with N as set of vertices and an edge from n to n′ labeled by (p, r) if
n′ ∈ X(n, p, r).
A path of N is a sequence (n1, p1, r1) (n2, p2, r2) · · · (nk, pk, rk) such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤
k − 1, ni+1 ∈ X(ni, pi, ri) . If n1 ∈ X(nk, pk, rk) then the path is also a cycle.
N is acyclic if its graph has no cycles, otherwise it is cyclic.
n0
n1
n2
nf
(F, st),
(D, st)
(M, st)
(M, st)
(D, am)
(F, y), (F, n), (F, am),
(D, y), (D, n)
(D, y), (D, n),
(M, y), (M, n)
n0
n1
n2
nf
Figure 2: Graphs of the negotiations in Figure 1.
The graphs of the negotiations in Figure 1 are shown in Figure 2. In the graph of the
negotiation on the right we have omitted the labels. The negotiation on the left of Figure
1 is acyclic, while the one the right is cyclic. Observe that in acyclic pre-negotiations
and negotiations every agent can reach an atom at most once.
Now we are ready to formally define negotiations.
Definition 4. A pre-negotiation N = (N,n0, nf ,X) is a negotiation if it satisfies the
following properties:
(1) every agent of A participates in both n0 and nf (i.e., Pn0 = Pnf = A);
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(2) for every (n, p, r) ∈ T (N): X(n, p, r) = ∅ iff n = nf .
(3) for every atom n ∈ N there is a path (n1, p1, r1) · · · (nk, pk, rk) such that n0 = n1,
nf = nk, and n = ni for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
We call a result r of an atom n final result for party p if X(n, p, r) = ∅. Condition (2) of
the above definition states that only the final atom has final results and that all results
of the final atom are final results for all its parties, which is – by (1) – the set of all
agents.
If |N | = 1 then the negotiation consists of a single atom, which is both the initial
atom n0 and the final atom nf ; further, in this case every result is final.
If |N | > 1 then n0 and nf are distinct; otherwise, in the graph of N the vertex n0
(= nf ) has no successor and so no other vertex can be on a path starting with n0.
Figure 1 shows two negotiations. The initial atoms have no ingoing arc (which is
not necessarily the case in general), whereas the final atoms have no outgoing arcs by
definition. Therefore, there is no graphical representation of the final results. Since
X(nf , p, r) = ∅ holds for every final result r and every agent p, any visual representation
holds no further information other than the existence of that result.
Condition (3) of the definition of negotiations is inspired by a corresponding property
of workflow Petri nets [dA98]. Paths of the graph represent possible subsequent atomic
negotiations of an agent. Therefore, if for some vertex there was no path from the initial
vertex (representing the initial atom) to that vertex, then the corresponding atom can
never take place (remember that all participants of all atoms participate in the initial
atom). As will become clear in the following subsection, we are mainly interested in
distributed negotiations which can always eventually terminate (represented by the final
atom); hence the requirement of a path from each vertex to the vertex representing the
final atom (which also involves all agents).
2.2. Semantics
A marking of a negotiation N = (N,n0, nf ,X) is a mapping x : A → 2N . Intuitively,
x(p) is the set of atoms that agent p is currently ready to engage in next. The initial
and final markings, denoted by x0 and xf respectively, are given by x0(p) = {n0} and
xf (p) = ∅ for every p ∈ A.
A marking x enables an atom n if n ∈ x(p) for every p ∈ Pn, i.e., if every party of n is
currently ready to engage in it. If x enables n, then n can take place and its parties agree
on a result r; we say that the outcome (n, r) occurs. The occurrence of (n, r) produces
a next marking x′ given by x′(p) = X(n, p, r) for every p ∈ Pn, and x′(p) = x(p) for
every p ∈ A \ Pn. We write x (n,r)−−−→ x′ to denote this, and call it a small step.
We write x1
σ−→ to denote that there is a sequence
x1
(n1,r1)−−−−→ x2 (n2,r2)−−−−→ · · · (nk−1,rk−1)−−−−−−−→ xk (nk,rk)−−−−→ xk+1 · · ·
of small steps such that σ = (n1, r1) . . . (nk, rk) . . .. We call σ an occurrence sequence
from marking x1. If σ is finite and ends with (nk, rk), then we write x1
σ−→ xk+1 and
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say that xk+1 is reachable from x1. If x1 is the initial marking, then we call σ an initial
occurrence sequence. If moreover xk+1 is the final marking, then σ is a large step.
Given an agent p, we always have that either x(p) = {n0} or x(p) = X(n, p, r) for
some atom n and result r. The marking xf can only be reached by the occurrence of
an outcome (nf , r), where nf is the final atom and thus r is a final result. It does not
enable any atom. Any other marking that does not enable any atom is a deadlock. A
marking which is reachable from itself but from which the final marking is not reachable
is a livelock.
Reachable markings are graphically represented by placing tokens (black dots) on the
forking points of the hyperarcs (or, if the hyperarc consists of just one arc, in the middle
of the arc). Figure 1 shows on the left a marking in which all agents are ready to engage
in nf and M moreover is ready to engage in n2. So the only enabled outcomes are (nf , rf ),
where rf is a final result. The figure on the right shoes a marking in which F and D are
ready to engage in n1 and M is ready to engage in n2. Since n1 involves only F and D
and has only the result tm, the only enabled outcome is (n2, tm).
2.3. Determinism and Weak Determinism
We introduce deterministic and weakly deterministic negotiations. Intuitively, an agent
of a negotiation is deterministic if it is never ready to engage in more than one atom;
graphically, an agent is deterministic if all hyperarcs of the agent are normal arcs. For-
mally:
Definition 5. An agent p ∈ A is deterministic if for every (n, p, r) ∈ T (N) such that
n 6= nf there exists one atom n′ such that X(n, p, r) = {n′}.
Consider again Figure 1. In the negotiation on the left, Father and Daughter are
deterministic agents, but Mother is not, because she has a proper hyperarc from n0 to
n2 and nf . After n0, Mother is ready to engage in the atoms n2 and nf .
The fundamental property of deterministic agents is that, loosely speaking, they
“force” atoms to occur. Assume that a deterministic agent is currently ready to en-
gage in atom n. Then the agent is not ready to engage in any other atom, and the only
way to change this is by executing n. Therefore, any extension of the current execution
to a large step must necessarily execute n.
Definition 6. A negotiation is deterministic if all its agents are deterministic.
A negotiation is weakly deterministic if for every (n, p, r) ∈ T (N) there is a deter-
ministic agent b that is a party of every atom in X(n, p, r), i.e., b ∈ Pn′ for every
n′ ∈ X(n, p, r).
Observe that every deterministic negotiation is also weakly deterministic. Consider
again Figure 1. The right negotiation is deterministic, while the left negotiation is not,
as Mother has a proper hyperarc from n0 to n2 and nf . However, the left negotiation is
weakly deterministic, as Daughter is deterministic and participates in every atom.
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3. Analysis Problems
We introduce a notion of well-behavedness of a negotiation which we call soundness. It
is similar to the soundness property of workflow Petri nets [dA98].
Definition 7. A negotiation is sound if
(a) every atom is enabled at some reachable marking, and
(b) every occurrence sequence from the initial marking is either a large step or can be
extended to a large step.
Intuitively, (a) captures that there are no useless atoms, and (b) that the negotiation
can never reach a state from which it cannot terminate. In particular, sound negotiations
can reach neither a deadlock nor a livelock.
The negotiations of Figure 1 are sound. However, if we set in the left negotiation
X(n0, M, st) = {n2} instead of X(n0, M, st) = {n2, nf}, then the occurrence sequence
(n0, st)(n1, yes) leads to a deadlock.
We now introduce the notion of summary transformer, and summary of a negotiation.
Intuitively, the summary transformer gives for each final outcome (nf , r) and for each
tuple of initial states q0 the possible resulting tuples of states, after the negotiation
finishes with the result r.
Definition 8. Given a negotiation N = (N,n0, nf ,X), we attach to each final result r
a summary transformer 〈N, r〉 ⊆ QA ×QA as follows.
Given two transformers τ1, τ2 ⊆ QA×QA, we define their concatenation as the trans-
former
τ1 τ2 = {(q, q′) ∈ QA ×QA | (q, q′′) ∈ τ1 and (q′′, q′) ∈ τ2 for some q′′ ∈ QA}
For every finite occurrence sequence σ = (n1, r1)(n2, r2) . . . (nk, rk) of N, define
〈σ〉 = δn1(r1) δn2(r2) · · · δnk(rk). Let Lr be the set of large steps of N that end with
(nf , r). We define 〈N, r〉 =
⋃
σ∈Lr〈σ〉.
Finally, we introduce the notion of equivalent negotiations and summary.
Definition 9. Two negotiations N1 and N2 over the same set of agents are equivalent
(N1 ≡ N2) if
(1) they are either both sound, or both unsound;
(2) they have the same final results; and
(3) 〈N1, r〉 = 〈N2, r〉 for every final result r.
If N1 and N2 are equivalent and N2 consists of a single atom, then N2 is the summary
of N1.
We collect some easy consequences of the definition.
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• A negotiation has a summary iff it is sound.
Indeed, if N is sound, then the negotiation with only one atom, all final results
of N as results of this atom, and with transformers 〈N, r〉 for each of these final
results r is a summary. Conversely, if N has a summary N′, then, since negotiations
consisting of one single atom are sound, N′ is sound. Since N ≡ N′, by condition
(1) N is sound.1
• Summaries are unique up to the identity of the single atom.
A negotiation with one single atom n is completely determined by the transformers
of n (observe that if two atoms have the same transformers then they necessarily
have the same sets of agents and results). So two one-atom negotiations whose
atoms have the same transformers are equivalent, although the two single atoms
need not be identical.
• Equivalence of negotiations is a congruence with respect to substitution: if in a
negotiation N we replace a subnegotiation M by an equivalent negotiation M′, then
the resulting negotiation N′ is equivalent to N.
The formal definitions of subnegotiation and “replacing a negotiation by an equiv-
alent one” are the expected ones, and the proof is easy but laborious, and we
omit it. Without condition (2) in Definition 9 the congruence property does not
hold. Indeed, without condition (2) the notion of substituting a negotiation by an
equivalent one is not even well defined.
• While Definition 9 preserves soundness in a way that makes substitutions possible,
there are behavioral aspects that are not preserved under equivalence. In particu-
lar, a negotiation with infinite behaviors may be equivalent to a negotiation having
none.
3.1. Deciding soundness
The soundness problem consists of deciding if a given negotiation is sound. It can be
solved with the help of the reachability graph.
The reachability graph of a negotiation N has all markings reachable from x0 as ver-
tices, and an edge from x to x′ whenever x
(n,r)−−−→ x′. To decide soundness we can (1)
compute the reachability graph of N and (2a) check that every atom appears at some
arc, and (2b) that, for every reachable marking x, there is an occurrence sequence σ
such that x
σ−→ xf .
Step (1) needs exponential time in the number of atoms, and steps (2a) and (2b) are
polynomial in the size of the reachability graph. So the algorithm is single exponential
in the number of atoms. Appendix A shows that this cannot be easily avoided, because
the problem is PSPACE-complete, and co-NP-hard and in DP for acyclic negotiations
1Alternatively, we could also define summaries of unsound negotiations by introducing unreliable atoms
that, intuitively, may “get stuck”. The summary of an unsound negotiation would then be an
unreliable atom with the same summary transformers as the original negotiation. In this paper we
do not further investigate this possibility.
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(a language L is in the class DP if there exist languages L1 in NP and L2 in co-NP such
that L = L1 ∩ L2 [PY82]).
Theorem 10. The soundness problem is PSPACE-complete. For acyclic negotiations,
the problem is co-NP-hard and in DP (and so at level ∆P2 of the polynomial hierarchy).
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.2. A summarization algorithm
The summarization problem consists of computing a summary of a given negotiation, if
it is sound. We show that the summary can be computed from the labeled reachability
graph of the negotiation.
Let 〈n, r〉 denote the transformer of the outcome (n, r). The labeled reachability graph
of a negotiationN is defined as its reachability graph, but labeling the edge corresponding
to a step x
(n,r)−−−→ x′ with the transformer 〈n, r〉. In other words, the labeled reachability
graph has an edge from x to x′ labeled with 〈n, r〉 for every step x (n,r)−−−→ x′.
Observe that the labeled reachability graph is in fact a multi-graph, since there may
be more than one edge between two nodes. Figure 3 shows a negotiation and its labeled
reachability graph. If all the results of a negotiation have different names, we can identify
an outcome (n, r) with the result r and further shorten 〈n, r〉 to 〈r〉.
a a a a
b b
c c d d
e e
〈a〉
〈c〉 〈d〉
〈d〉 〈c〉
〈e〉
〈f〉
〈b〉
〈b〉
Figure 3: A negotiation and its labeled reachability graph. We assume that the only
outcome of the final atom is (nf , f).
The concatenation of two transformers was already introduced in Definition 8. Sim-
ilarly we define the union τ1 ∪ τ2 of two transformers, and the Kleene star τ∗ of a
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transformer:
τ1 ∪ τ2 = {(q, q′) ∈ QA ×QA | (q, q′) ∈ τ1 or (q, q′) ∈ τ2}
τ0 = {(q, q) ∈ QA ×QA | q ∈ QA}
τ i+1 = τ τ i for every i ≥ 0
τ∗ =
⋃
i≥0 τ
i
By definition, the summary transformer 〈N, f〉 is the union over all large steps σ
ending with (nf , f) of the transformers 〈σ〉. We recall a well-known algorithm for the
computation of this union based on state elimination (see e.g. [HMU06]). The algorithm
iteratively reduces the graph to smaller graphs with the same summary transformers,
until the graph contains only the nodes x0 and xf , and one edge x0
τr−→ xf for each final
outcome (nf , f) of N. Then we have τr = 〈N, f〉. At each step, the algorithm applies
one of the following three reduction rules:
(1) Replace a pair x1
τ−→ x2, x1 τ
′−→ x2 of distinct edges, where x2 6= xf , by an edge
x1
τ∪τ ′−−−→ x2.
(2) Given a self-loop x
τ−→ x, replace every edge x τ ′−→ x′ such that x′ 6= x by an edge
x
τ∗τ ′−−→ x′, and then remove the self-loop.
(3) Given an edge x′ τ
′−→ x such that x′ 6= x and x has at least one successor, add
for every edge x
τ ′′−→ x′′ a shortcut edge x′ τ ′ τ ′′−−−→ x′′, and then remove the edge
x′ τ−→ x. Further, if after removing this edge the node x has no other incoming
edges, then remove x, together with all its outgoing edges.
The algorithm applies rules (1)-(3) in phases. At each phase, it follows this strategy:
• Apply rule (1) as long as possible.
• Apply rule (2) as long as possible.
• When neither rule (1) nor (2) are applicable, select a node x different from x0 and
xf , and apply rule (3) to all its ingoing edges, that is, to all edges of the form
x′ τ
′−→ x. (Observe that this step necessarily ends with the removal of x and its
outgoing edges.)
It is easy to see that the application of any of these rules does not change the summary
of the graph. In particular, the idea behind rule (3) is that, in every large step, a step
x′ τ
′−→ x must necessarily be followed by one of the steps x τ ′′−→ x′′. After all shortcut
edges have been added, the edge x′ τ
′−→ x becomes redundant: the two graphs with and
without the edge have the same summary.
After each phase the number of nodes decreases by one. If the original negotiation is
sound (which implies that every node of the reachability graph lies on a path starting
at the initial marking x0 and ending at the final marking xf ), then the algorithm can
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only terminate with a graph containing exactly the nodes x0 and xf , and an edge from
x0 to xf for each final result. If the original negotiation is not sound because from some
reachable marking the final marking cannot be reached, then the algorithm terminates
with a graph containing additional nodes. If the original negotiation is not sound only
because some atom can never be executed, then the algorithm terminates with a graph
as in the sound case.
When applied to the labeled reachability graph shown in Figure 3, the algorithm
reduces the graph completely because the negotiation is sound. Figure 4 shows some
intermediate steps of the algorithm.
〈a〉
〈b〉∗〈c〉 〈b〉∗〈d〉
〈d〉 〈b〉∗〈c〉
〈e〉
〈f〉
〈a〉
〈b〉∗〈c〉〈d〉 〈b〉∗〈d〉〈b〉∗〈c〉
〈e〉
〈f〉
〈a〉(〈b〉∗〈c〉〈d〉 ∪
〈b〉∗〈d〉〈b〉∗〈c〉)〈e〉〈f〉
Figure 4: Intermediate steps in the reduction of the graph of Figure 3.
This algorithm is simple and elegant, but it suffers from the state-explosion problem:
the size of the reachability graph can be exponential in the size of the negotiation, and so
the algorithm has exponential worst-case time complexity. While the complexity results
of Section 3 show that this is unavoidable unless PSPACE=P, the main problem is that
the algorithm takes exponential time for any family of negotiations whose reachability
graphs exhibit exponential growth, even if the negotiations have a very simple structure.
In the next section we present reduction rules that act directly on the negotiation
diagram, not on the reachability graph, and thus can be applied without constructing
it. The rules can be applied to any negotiation, until no reduction is possible anymore.
If the resulting negotiation consists of one single atom, the summary can be read out
directly from it. Otherwise the algorithm above can be applied, with the advantage that,
since the negotiation is now smaller, the reachability graph is smaller, too.
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4. Reduction Rules for Negotiations
We introduce four reduction rules acting on negotiation diagrams. The rules are correct
in the following sense: The negotiation obtained after applying a rule is equivalent to
the negotiation before applying it. In particular, this implies that the rules preserve
soundness, unsoundness and the summary.
The first two rules are straightforward generalizations of the rules applied in steps (1)
and (2) of the summarization algorithm of Section 3.2.
The third rule deals with a characteristic of negotiation diagrams that is not present
when we consider their reachability graphs. Finally, the last rule is a generalization of
the one applied in step (3), but it is far from straightforward, and we will discuss it in
detail.
4.1. Reduction Rules
A reduction rule, or just a rule, is a binary relation on the set of negotiations. Given
a rule R, we write N1
R−→ N2 for (N1,N2) ∈ R. Notice that a rule R is not necessarily
applicable to a given negotiation N1. If it is applicable, then the resulting negotiation
N2 is not necessarily unique.
We describe rules as pairs of a guard and an action; N1
R−→ N2 holds if N1 satisfies the
guard and N2 is a possible result of applying the action to N1.
A rule R is correct if its application to a negotiation always yields an equivalent
negotiation, i.e., if N1
R−→ N2 implies N1 ≡ N2. In particular, this implies that N1 is
sound iff N2 is sound.
A finite sequence R1 . . . Rk of rules is a reduction sequence for a negotiation N if there
are N1, . . . ,Nk such that N
R1−−→ N1 R2−−→ · · · Rk−−→ Nk. We say that the sequence reduces N
to Nk. Infinite reduction sequences are defined similarly
2.
A set of correct rules R is complete with respect to a class of negotiations if every
sound negotiation in the class can be reduced to a negotiation consisting of a single atom
by a finite sequence of reductions in R.
In the following we introduce the reduction rules for negotiations. For convenience,
we assume in this section that a rule is applied to a negotiation N = (N,n0, nf ,X).
The actions are formulated as assignments to the components of N, so that the reduced
negotiation is the one obtained after performing these assignments.
4.2. Merge and iteration rules
Merge rule. The merge rule merges results with identical transition functions into one.
2Infinite reduction sequences are of course undesirable. We define them, but show how to avoid them.
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Definition 11. Merge rule
Guard: N contains an atom n, n 6= nf with two distinct results r1, r2 ∈ Rn such
that X(n, p, r1) = X(n, p, r2) for every p ∈ Pn.
Action: (1) Rn ← (Rn \ {r1, r2}) ∪ {r}, where r is a fresh name.
(2) For all p ∈ Pn: X(n, p, r)← X(n, p, r1).
(3) δn(r)← δn(r1) ∪ δn(r2).
n
a b a b a b
Merge
rule
n
c c c
〈c〉 := 〈a〉 ∪ 〈b〉
Figure 5: Illustration of the merge rule
An example is sketched in Figure 5. The results a and b are merged into one result c
with an appropriate transformer.
Observe that the guard forbids application of the merge rule to the final atom; by
the definition of equivalence, merging results of the final atom yields a non-equivalent
negotiation. Notice further that the result of applying the rule is always a negotiation,
according to Definition 4.
Iteration rule. Loosely speaking, the iteration rule removes self-loops, i.e., it removes
results of an atom after which all parties are ready to take part only in the same atom
again. The rule changes the transformers of all other results of that atom.
Definition 12. Iteration rule
Guard: N contains an outcome (n, r) such that X(n, p, r) = {n} for every party p
of n.
Action: (1) Rn ← Rn \ {r}.
(2) For every r′ ∈ Rn: δn(r′)← δn(r)∗ δn(r′).
For an example, consider Figure 6. The result a for which all agents stay in n is
removed and the transformer of result b is changed.
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na a a
b b b
Iteration
rule
n
b b b 〈b〉 := 〈a〉∗〈b〉
Figure 6: Illustration of the iteration rule
Observe that the application of the rule always yields a negotiation. Indeed, before
applying the rule every atom lies on some path of the negotiation graph leading from
the initial to the final atom; since the rule only removes a self-loop of this graph, the
same property holds after the rule is applied.
The correctness of the merge and iteration rules is an immediate consequence of the
definitions, and we state it without proof.
Theorem 13. The merge rule and the iteration rule are correct.
4.3. Useless arc rule
If the graphical representation of a negotiation contains a hyperarc for some agent leading
from an atom n to atoms {n1, . . . , nk}, we say that this hyperarc consists of k different
arcs.
Definition 14. An arc of the negotiation N is a tuple (n, p, r, n′) such that (n, p, r) ∈
T (N) and n′ ∈ X(n, p, r).
Some of these arcs may be “useless”. Intuitively, an arc is useless if no occurrence
sequence makes a token flow along it. More precisely, an arc (n, p, r, n′′) is useless if
in every initial occurrence sequence, atom n′′ is never enabled after the occurrence of
the outcome (n, r), and n′′ remains disabled unless another atom involving agent p has
occurred.
Consider as an example the negotiation in Figure 7. The arc for agent A from n to n′′
can never be “used”, that is, after outcome (n, r) agent A is ready to engage in n′ and
also in n′′, but n′′ can not happen directly after n because after (n, r) agent B is only
ready to engage in n′. Thus n′ must happen before n′′, and agent A is also required for
n′.
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A B
n
A B
n′
A B
n′′
r r
Figure 7: Example of a useless arc
The useless arc rule deletes useless arcs, which obviously preserves the occurrence
sequences of the negotiation. However, in general useless arcs may be very difficult to
identify. So, instead of requiring in the guard of the rule that an arc is useless, we require
a stronger, but easier to check condition.
Definition 15. Useless arc rule
Guard: • There are three distinct arcs (n, p, r, n′), (n, p, r, n′′), (n, q, r, n′), such
that X(n, q, r) = {n′}.
• The pre-negotiation obtained by removing the arc (n, p, r, n′′) (see the
action of this rule) is a negotiation, i.e., satisfies the conditions of
Definition 4.
Action: X(n, p, r)← X(n, p, r) \ {n′′}.
p qn
q pn
′′
p qn
′
r r
Useless arc rule
p qn
q pn
′′
p qn
′
r r
Figure 8: Illustration of the useless arc rule
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Intuitively (see Figure 8), after choosing r at atom n, agent p is ready to engage in
both n′ and n′′. However, another party q of both n′ and n′′ is only willing to engage in
n′. Then agent p can never engage directly in n′′ after n, and so this part of the hyperarc
can be removed without changing the behavior.
To see why the second part of the guard is necessary, recall that in a negotiation every
atom lies on some path from the initial to the final atom. Without the second part, the
result of applying the rule may no longer satisfy this condition. For example, it is easy
to define a negotiation in which all paths from the initial to the final atom containing n′′
traverse the arc (n, p, r, n′′). We will show later that for the negotiations of the classes
of negotiations considered in this paper, the second part of the guard is always true and
can be omitted.
For the correctness proof we first specify what it means for an arc to occur in an
occurrence sequence.
Definition 16. An arc (n, p, r, n′) of a negotiation occurs in an occurrence sequence σ
if σ = σ1 (n, r)σ2 (n
′, r′)σ3 for some outcome r′ of n′, and agent p does not participate
in any outcome of σ2.
Lemma 17. Let (n, p, r, n′) be an arc of a negotiation N1 that does not occur in any
initial occurrence sequence and belongs to a hyperarc with more than one arc. If the
result of removing this arc is a negotiation N2 then N2 is equivalent to N1.
Proof. Assume that N2 is a negotiation. We proceed by showing that N2 is equivalent
to N1.
We claim that N1 and N2 have the same occurrence sequences. Since X2(n
′′, p′′, r′′) ⊆
X1(n
′′, p′′, r′′) for every (n′′, p′′, r′′) ∈ T (N1), every occurrence sequence of N2 is also an
occurrence sequence of N1. Since the transition functions only differ in (n, p, r), and
the arc (n, p, r, n′) never occurs in an initial occurrence sequence of N1, every initial
occurrence sequence of N1 is an initial occurrence sequence of N2, and the claim is
proved.
A first immediate consequence of the claim is that an atom can occur in N1 iff it can
occur in N2. It remains to show that every occurrence sequence of N1 can be extended to
a large step iff the same holds for N2. Since both negotiations have the same occurrence
sequences, we only have to show that an occurrence sequence is a large step of N1 iff it
is a large step of N2. For this we observe that the markings x1 and x2 of N1 and N2
reached by executing an occurrence sequence σ in both N1 and N2 can only differ with
respect to agent p and atom n′′: If x1 6= x2, then n′, n′′ ∈ x2(p), whereas n′ ∈ x1(p)
but n′′ /∈ x2(p). If σ is a large step of N1 or N2 then x1(p) = ∅ or x2(p) = ∅, and so
x1 = x2.
Theorem 18. The useless arc rule is correct.
Proof. We adopt the notations of Definition 15 and show that an arc removed by the rule
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 17. After every occurrence of (n, r), agent q is only
ready to engage in n′. Therefore, after an occurrence of (n, r′) the atom n′′ must occur
before n′ can occur. Thus the arc (n, p, r, n′) can never occur in any initial occurrence
sequence.
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4.4. Shortcut rule
The shortcut rule is inspired by the rule used in step (3) of the summarization algorithm
presented in Section 3.2. Intuitively, the goal of the rule is to remove an outcome (n, r)
such that, for every large step σ containing (n, r) of the original negotiation, there is a
large step σ′ of the reduced negotiation that does not contain (n, r), such that 〈σ〉 = 〈σ′〉.
Moreover, sometimes the rule must allow us to remove some successor atom of (n, r);
otherwise we never reduce the number of atoms. Finally, this must be achieved while
preserving the sound or the unsound character of a negotiation.
As a warm-up we first define the rule for the simple case of negotiations with only one
agent. Then we illustrate the problems involved in extending the rule to arbitrary nego-
tiations. Finally, we introduce the rule for the general case and provide its correctness
proof.
In the one-agent case we can consider atoms and outcomes as nodes and edges of a
graph (see e.g. Figure 9a). We write n
r−→ n′ instead of X(n, p, r) = {n′}, where p is the
single agent of the negotiation. Informally, the rule states:
(1) If n
r−→ n′ and n′ 6= nf , then
– add for every n′′ such that n′ r
′−→ n′′ a new shortcut n r′′−→ n′′ with transformer
〈n, r′′〉 = 〈n, r〉〈n′, r′〉, and then remove n r−→ n′;
– if n′ has no other incoming edges, then remove n′, together with its outgoing
edges.
(2) If n
r−→ nf , r is the only result of n and nf has no other incoming edges, then
– add for every result r′ of nf a new result r′′ of n with X(n, p, r′′) = ∅ and
transformer 〈n, r′′〉 = 〈n, r〉〈n′, r′〉, and then remove n r−→ n′;
– remove nf ;
– consider n as the new final atom.
For example, in the negotiation of Figure 9a we can apply the rule to n2
d−→ n3,
obtaining the negotiation of Figure 9b, and then to n1
c−→ n3, yielding the negotiation of
Figure 9c.
To see why we require n′ 6= nf in the guard of part (1) of the rule, consider Figure
9c. Without this condition, the application of the rule to n1
c′−→ nf replaces the result
c′ by a new result, say c′′, such that X(n1, p, c′′) = ∅ (graphically, the arc from n1 to nf
disappears). The result is not even a negotiation, because in a negotiation all atoms but
the final one must have at least one outgoing edge.
Part (2) of the rule allows us to apply the rule to n3
e−→ nf in Figure 9a. Since nf
has no other incoming edge, it is removed. Atom n3 loses its only outgoing edge, and
becomes the new final atom. To preserve equivalence, the results of nf are transferred
to the new final atom n3.
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n1 n2
n3
nf
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c d
e
(a) Initial negotiation
n0
n1 n2
n3
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a b
c
df
e
(b) Shortcut of (n2,d)
n0
n1 n2
nf
a b
c’ d’
(c) Shortcut of (n3, c)
Figure 9: Shortcut for one agent
A B C
B C
n1
A B
n2
A B C
a a a
c c
d d
b b b
Figure 10: Searching for a shortcut rule
In the case of multiple agents, defining a correct shortcut rule is more complicated.
Consider the negotiation of Figure 10. The large steps of this negotiation are
(n0, a), (n1, c), (n2, d), (nf , f)
where f is a final result, and
(n0, b), (n2, d), (nf , f).
So, if (n1, c) occurs, it is succeeded by (n2, d). However, there is no obvious way to
remove the outcome (n1, c) by shortcutting it with its “successor” (n2, d), in particular
because the latter has an additional participant. For this reason, we apply the shortcut
rule only to outcomes (n, r) such that, after executing them, an atom n′ is enabled, and
remains enabled until it occurs. This condition apparently depends on the markings
enabling (n, r). Since there is no efficient way to identify the markings reachable from
the initial marking and since the conditions for applying the rule must be easy to verify,
we require that any marking, reachable or not, that enables (n, r), subsequently enables
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n′ until it occurs. For example, in Figure 10 we can shortcut (n0, a), because after its
occurrence the atom n1 is enabled, and can become disabled only by the occurrence of
n1. However, we cannot shortcut (n1, c), because the marking that places a token on
each of the ingoing arcs of n1 does enable n1, but after (n1, c) occurs no other atom is
enabled.
The following simple structural condition formulates an obvious sufficient condition
of the property mentioned before.
Definition 19 (Unconditionally enables). An outcome (n, r) unconditionally enables
an atom n′ if Pn ⊇ Pn′ and X(n, p, r) = {n′} for every p ∈ Pn′.
We now consider a second problem. If a negotiation is sound before application of
the shortcut rule to an outcome (n, r) and an atom n′, and after the shortcut the atom
n′ is not enabled at any reachable marking, then we must remove n′, otherwise the
negotiation becomes unsound. For example, if in the sound negotiation of Figure 9 we
do not remove n3 after shortcutting n1
c−→ n3, we are left with an unsound negotiation. In
the one-agent case, the atom n′ can be enabled after the shortcut iff it still has incoming
edges. However, in the case of multiple agents, deciding whether n′ must be removed or
not can be much harder. Consider the sound negotiation of Figure 11. The only result
of n2 enables n3 unconditionally. After shortcutting this result the atom n3 can never
become enabled, and must be removed. However, after the shortcut all ports of n3 still
have incoming edges, and so this criterion does not suffice to decide whether the atom
must be removed. In general, deciding if n′ must be removed is an intractable problem
(observe that it is equivalent to deciding whether these arcs are useless). Fortunately, it
suffices to consider two cases for which the decision is simple, and to apply the shortcut
rule only in these cases.
First, as in the one-agent case, if after the shortcut no edge leads to a port of n′, then
n′ cannot be enabled, and must be removed. This is the case if all ports have, before
applying the rule, only one ingoing arc, namely the one from n labeled by r. In this case
we say that (n, r) has exclusive access to n′.
Definition 20 (Exclusive access). An outcome (n, r) has exclusive access to an atom
n′ if, for each p ∈ Pn′, n′ ∈ X(n, p, r) and n′ /∈ X(n′′, p, r′′) for (n, r) 6= (n′′, r′′).
So, if after the shortcut all ports of n′ have no ingoing arc, we can remove n′. Assume
now that after the shortcut some deterministic arc leads to a port of n′ (that is, an arc
which is not a proper hyperarc). Say this arc corresponds to an outcome (n′′, r′′). As we
shall see, if the negotiation was sound before the shortcut, then n′′ can still be enabled
after it, the outcome (n′′, r′′) can occur, and n′ is the only atom removing the token on
the above deterministic arc. So keeping n′ preserves the soundness in this case. If the
negotiation was unsound before, then keeping n′ will obviously not make the resulting
negotiation sound. So in both cases, if n′ is not removed the sound/unsound character
of the negotiation is preserved.
If (n, r) unconditionally enables n′ and has exclusive access to n′ then a shortcut is
possible and n′ has to be removed.
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Definition 21 (Commits to). An outcome (n′′, r′′) commits to an atom n′ if {n′} =
X(n′′, p, r′′) for some p ∈ Pn′′.
As in the case of a single agent, we can only have n′ = nf if n′ is removed and n
qualifies as a new final atom. Therefore, we require n′ 6= nf unless (n, r) has exclusive
access to n′ and moreover r is the only result of n.
Equipped with Definitions 19, 20 and 21 we can now formally define the general
shortcut rule, illustrated in Figure 12.
n0
n1
n2
n3
nf
Figure 11: Problematic case for a shortcut
Definition 22. Shortcut rule
Guard: N contains an outcome (n, r) that unconditionally enables an atom n′ dis-
tinct from n. Moreover:
• n′ 6= nf and (n, r) has exclusive access to n′, or
• n′ 6= nf and some outcome (n′′, r′′) 6= (n, r) commits to n′, or
• n′ = nf , the outcome (n, r) has exclusive access to n′, and r is the
only result of n.
Action: (1) Rn ← (Rn \ {r}) ∪ {r′s | r′ ∈ Rn′}, where r′s are fresh names.
(2) For all p ∈ Pn′ and all r′ ∈ Rn′: X(n, p, r′s)← X(n′, p, r′).
For all p ∈ Pn \ Pn′ and all r′ ∈ Rn′: X(n, p, r′s)← X(n, p, r).
(3) For all r′ ∈ Rn′: δn(r′s)← δn(r)δn′(r′).
(4) If (n, r) has exclusive access to n′, then remove n′.
(5) If n′ was the final atom before applying the rule and is removed, then
n is the new final atom.
Consider the negotiation of Figure 10. We can shortcut result a of n0 because it
unconditionally enables n1 and has exclusive access to it. We can also shortcut result b,
because it unconditionally enables n2 and result a of n0 (or result c of n1) commits to
n2.
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Figure 12: Illustration of the shortcut rule
Consider now Figure 11. We cannot shortcut the results of n0 and n1 because they
do not unconditionally enable any node. The result of n2 unconditionally enables n3,
but we cannot shortcut it either: it does not have exclusive access to n3, and no other
result commits to n3. The result of n3 unconditionally enables nf with exclusive access,
and so we can shortcut it. The application of the rule removes nf , and n3 becomes the
new final atom of the negotiation.
Theorem 23. The shortcut rule is correct.
Proof. Let N2 be the result of applying the shortcut rule to N1. Assume the atoms n
and n′ and the result r ∈ Rn are as in the shortcut rule (Definition 22). We first show
that N2 is in fact a negotiation.
• X(n′′, p, r′′) = ∅ if and only if n′′ = nf in N2. This is obviously the case if n′ was
not the final atom before the reduction. If it was the final atom, then we only
apply the rule if we also remove n′, and if moreover n has only the single result r.
So it remains to show that in this case n satisfies the criteria of a final atom.
We have Pn′ ⊆ Pn because (n, r) unconditionally enables n′. We have Pn′ = A
because n′ = nf , and therefore Pn = A. By definition of the rule, X(n, p, r) = ∅
after the rule was applied, for all agents p. Since r is the only result, we obtain
X(n, p, r′′) = ∅ for all results r′′. So n qualifies as new final atom. The transition
function X is not changed by the rule application for any other atom.
• Every atom n′′ of N2 is on a path from the initial atom to the final atom in the
graph of the negotiation. Consider first the case n′′ 6= n′. A path of N2 that
visits n′′ is either a path of N1, or it is obtained from a path of N1 by replacing
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(n, p, r)(n′, p′, r′) by (n, p′, r′s). So, no matter if n′ is the final atom or not, n2 lies
on some path of N2 from n0 to nf .
Assume now n′′ = n′. Then n′ has not been removed by the rule, and so (n, r)
does not have exclusive access to n′. This implies that some party p of n′ has an
additional input arc, i.e., that p is in X(n′′′, p, r′′′) for some (n, r) 6= (n′′′, r′′′). There
is a path from n0 via n
′′′ to n′, before and after application of the rule. Moreover,
the path from n′ to nf remains unchanged by the rule application (assuming that
n′ does not occur again in the path). So, also after application of the rule, n′ is on
a path from n0 to nf .
We continue by studying the relation between occurrence sequences in N1 and N2.
We introduce the concept of corresponding sequences which we then use to show that
soundness of N1 implies soundness of N2 and vice versa. We say that an atom n occurs
in an occurrence sequence σ if (n, r) occurs in σ for some r ∈ Rn.
For each initial occurrence sequence σ2 of N2, replacing all occurrences of (n, r
′
s) by
(n, r), (n′, r′) yields an initial occurrence sequence σ1 of N1. We call σ1 the occurrence
sequence in N1 corresponding to σ2. The markings reached by these two sequences are
the same.
For each initial occurrence sequence σ1 of N1, between each two occurrences of (n, r)
there is an occurrence of (n′, r′) (with possibly varying r′) because n unconditionally
enables n′. Thus only the last occurrence of (n, r) might not be followed by an oc-
currence of n′, which may happen only if n′ is still enabled. We transform σ1 =
σa(n, r)σ
′
a(n
′, ra)σb(n, r)σ′b(n
′, rb) . . . to a sequence σ2 = σa(n, raf )σ′aσb(n, rbf )σ′b . . . of
N2. Should, in σ1, the last occurrence of (n, r) not be followed by an occurrence of n
′,
we instead apply the transformation to the extended sequence σ1(n
′, r′) for some r′. In
both cases, this yields an occurrence sequence σ2 of N2, which we call the corresponding
sequence to σ1, and which leads to the same marking as σ1 (or σ1(n
′, r′)).
(1) Assume that N1 is sound. We prove that N2 is sound.
First we show that every atom n˜ of N2 can be enabled by some initial occurrence
sequences, and then that every initial occurrence sequence σ2 in N2 can be extended to
a large step. For the first part, we consider two cases.
Case n˜ 6= n′. Since N1 is sound, n˜ can be enabled by some initial occurrence sequence
σ1 of N1. Since the corresponding sequence σ2 in N2 leads to the same marking as either
σ1 or σ1(n
′, r′) for some r′, it also enables n˜. (Note that the addition of (n′, r′) to the
occurrence sequence cannot influence that n˜ is enabled: We only add (n′, r′) if it was
unconditionally enabled by some prior occurrence of (n, r), but then the agents of n′
were only ready to engage in n′ and thus do not participate in n˜.)
Case n˜ = n′. Since n′ is still an atom of N2 and by the definition of the guard of
the rule, some outcome (n′′, r′′) 6= (n, r) of N1 commits to n′, i.e., there is (n′′, p′′, r′′) ∈
T (N1) such that (n
′′, r′′) 6= (n, r) and {n′} = X(n′′, p′′, r′′). Since (n′′, r′′) 6= (n, r),
the outcome (n′′, r′′) is unchanged in N2. By soundness of N1, some initial occurrence
sequence σ1 of N1 enables n
′′. We extend it by an occurrence of (n′′, r′′) and then
to a large step σ1(n
′′, r′′)ρ1 in N1, which is possible since N1 is sound. Since after
(n′′, r′′) agent p′′ is only ready to engage in n′, the sequence ρ1 contains an occurrence
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of n′. During the construction we replace occurrences of (n, r) and those occurrences
of n′ that are direct consequences of the occurrence of some (n, r). We will however
not replace the occurrence of n′ that was caused by (n′′, r′′), and so the corresponding
sequence in N2 will also contain an occurrence of n
′. Thus n′ can be enabled in N2.
We now prove that every initial occurrence sequence σ2 in N2 can be extended to a
large step. Take the corresponding occurrence sequence σ1 in N1 and extend it to a large
step τ1 = σ1ρ1 in N1 (possible by soundness of N1). The corresponding sequence in N2
is τ2 = σ2ρ2, which is an extension of σ2 (by construction of corresponding sequences)
to a large step.
(2) Assume that N2 is sound. We prove that N1 is sound.
Since every atom in N2 can be enabled by some initial occurrence sequence, using the
corresponding sequence in N1 we see that the same is true for all atoms but n
′. Further,
it is easy to show that also n′ can be enabled in N1: Take the initial occurrence sequence
that enables n and extend it by (n, r), which unconditionally enables n′.
For an initial occurrence sequence σ1 in N1, the corresponding occurrence sequence
σ2 in N2 can be extended to a large step τ2 = σ2ρ2 in N2, because N2 is sound. Let
τ1 be the occurrence sequence of N1 that corresponds to τ2. Then τ1 = σ
′
1ρ
′
1 where σ
′
1
corresponds to σ2, by the definition of “corresponds”. Now either σ1 or σ1(n
′, r′) leads
to the same marking as σ2, and σ2 leads to the same marking as σ
′
1. Therefore, either
σ1ρ
′
1 or σ1(n
′, r′)ρ′1 is a large step of N1.
4.5. Rules Preserve (Weak-)Determinism
We conclude the section with a simple but important observation.
Proposition 24. If a negotiation N1 is deterministic (weakly deterministic) and the
application of one of the rules above yields negotiation N2, then N2 is also deterministic
(weakly deterministic, respectively). Further, if N1 is acyclic, then so is N2.
Proof. For the merge rule and the iteration rule the proposition is obvious. The useless-
arc rule removes an arc and thus may even lead to a deterministic negotiation starting
from a weakly deterministic one (but never the other way round). For the shortcut
rule, observe that, by the definition of the rule, for every (n2, a2, r2) ∈ T (N2) there is
(n1, a1, r1) ∈ T (N1) such that X2(n2, a2, r2) = X(n1, a1, r1) (in fact, we can always take
a1 = a2). Since whether a negotiation N is deterministic or weakly deterministic only
depends on the set {X(n, a, r) | (n, a, r) ∈ T (N)}, we are done. Finally, the definitions
of the rules imply immediately that acyclicity is preserved (but not cyclicity).
4.6. Reducible outcomes
In the rest of the paper we present reduction algorithms for different classes of negotia-
tions. All of them repeatedly choose a reducible outcome, and apply the corresponding
rule. Formally:
Definition 25. Let N be a negotiation. An outcome (n, r) of N is reducible if
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• it satisfies the guard of the iteration or the shortcut rule; or
• it satisfies, together with another outcome, the guard of the merge rule; or
• (n, p, r, n′′) is a useless arc for some agent p and atom n′′.
The set of reducible outcomes of N is denoted R(N).
As we shall see, a nondeterministic reduction procedure that can choose any reducible
outcome may not terminate, or terminate in exponentially many steps. In order to
obtain polynomial algorithms we will constrain the choices of the procedure.
5. Summarizing Acyclic Weakly Deterministic Negotiations
Recall that if a set of rules is complete for a class of negotiations, then it completely re-
duces all (and only) sound negotiations in the class to an atomic negotiation. Therefore,
a reduction procedure that transforms every negotiation in the class into an equivalent
irreducible negotiation allows us to check soundness and compute a summary without
constructing the reachability graph of the negotiation. Indeed, the negotiation is sound
iff its corresponding irreducible negotiation is atomic.
Definition 26. Let R be a set of rules and let N be a negotiation.
A negotiation is irreducible with respect to R if no rule of R can be applied to it.
A finite or infinite reduction sequence R1R2R3 . . . for N over R is maximal if it is,
applied to N, either infinite or if it is finite and cannot be extended, i.e. leads to an
irreducible negotiation.
In this section we show that the rules presented in the previous section are complete for
acyclic, weakly deterministic negotiations. This class contains for example the Father
/ Daughter / Mother negotiation from the beginning of this paper. Further, we show in
Section 5.1 that if the negotiation is deterministic, then there is a reduction algorithm
that reaches an irreducible negotiation after a polynomial number of rule applications,
and thus runs in polynomial time. Whether such an algorithm also exists in the weakly
deterministic case is an open problem.
Acyclicity is a severe restriction, which in particular implies that every atom occurs
at most once. However, the results on acyclic negotiations will be reused as lemmas in
the following sections, where we consider cyclic deterministic negotiations.
We start with a first lemma, showing that for acyclic negotiations the guard of the
useless arc rule can be simplified.
Lemma 27. Let N be an acyclic negotiation. N can be transformed into N′ by the use-
less arc rule iff it can be transformed into N′ by the following rule:
Guard: • There are three distinct arcs (n, p, r, n′), (n, p, r, n′′), (n, q, r, n′), such
that X(n, q, r) = {n′}.
• The arc (n, p, r, n′′) is not the only arc leading to a port of n′′.
Action: X(n, p, r)← X(n, p, r) \ {n′}.
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If moreover N is sound, then N can be transformed into N′ by the useless arc rule iff it
can be transformed into N′ by the following rule:
Guard: There are three distinct arcs (n, p, r, n′), (n, p, r, n′′), (n, q, r, n′), such that
X(n, q, r) = {n′}.
Action: X(n, p, r)← X(n, p, r) \ {n′}.
Proof. Assume that N is acyclic.
(⇐) If N can be transformed into N′ by the useless arc rule, then after removing the
useless arc (n, p, r, n′′) the node n′′ still lies on a path from the initial to the final node,
and so N contains another arc leading to n′′. So N can also be transformed into N′ by
the new rule.
(⇒) Roughly speaking, we have to show that after applying the new rule to an acyclic
negotiation, the resulting pre-negotiation is actually a negotiation, i.e., every node is
still on a path from n0 to nf in the graph of the resulting pre-negotiation. Obviously,
all paths which do not contain an arc leading from n to n′′ are not changed by the rule
application. So it suffices to show that that every node of N lies on some path from n0
to nf which does not contain such an arc.
Consider an arbitrary atom n˜. There is a path of N from n0 to n˜. By assumption
there is an arc leading from some atom n1 to n
′′.If the path from n0 to n˜ contains an arc
from n to n′′, then we can replace the prefix up to n by a path from n0 to n1, yielding
a path from n0 to n˜ without the arc. By acyclicity, this path does not contain n
′′. If a
path from n˜ to nf contains an arc from n to n
′′ then we can replace the suffix from n′′ by
a path from n′ to nf . Again by acyclicity, this path does not contain n. Summarizing,
after the rule application the node n˜ is again on a path from n0 to nf , and we are done.
Assume now that N is acyclic and moreover sound.
(⇐) Obvious.
(⇒) If the negotiation is sound, then the atom n′′ definitely has more ingoing arcs than
the useless one, and we can apply the first part of the lemma.
Theorem 28. Let N be an acyclic and weakly deterministic negotiation, and let ρ be a
maximal reduction sequence for N using only the shortcut, merge and useless arc rules.
Then ρ is finite, and it reduces N to an atomic negotiation iff N is sound.
Proof. We first prove that ρ is finite. It suffices to show that none of the shortcut, merge,
and useless arc rules can be applied infinitely often in a reduction sequence. Let N2 be
the result of applying any of the rules to a negotiation N1. For every large step σ of
N2, let φ(σ) be defined as follows: if the useless arc rule or the merge rule has been
applied, then φ(σ) = σ; if the shortcut rule has been applied to atoms n, n′, then let
φ(σ) be the result of replacing every occurrence of (n, r′f ) by the sequence (n, r)(n
′, r′).
We have |σ| ≤ |φ(σ)| for every large step σ. Moreover, if the shortcut rule is applied,
then |σ′| < |φ(σ′)| for at least one large step σ′, indeed for all large steps containing
(n, r′f ).
None of the rules destroy acyclicity, i.e., all considered negotiations are acyclic. In
an acyclic negotiation, the length of a large step is bounded by the number of atoms,
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and so the set of large steps is finite. Therefore, no infinite sequence of applications of
the rules can contain infinitely many applications of the shortcut rule. So any infinite
sequence of applications must, from some point on, only apply the useless arc rule and
the merge rule. But this is also not possible as both rules reduce the number of arcs.
This completes the proof that ρ is finite.
Assume that N is not sound. Since the three rules are correct, ρ reduces N to an
unsound negotiation N′. By definition of soundness, atomic negotiations are sound.
Therefore, N′ is not atomic.
Assume now that N is sound. We prove that ρ reduces N to an atomic negotiation.
The proof has two parts:
(1) If N has more than two atoms, then the shortcut rule or the useless arc rule can be
applied to it.
Since N is acyclic, its graph induces a partial order on atoms in the obvious way
(n < n′ if there is a path from n to n′). Clearly n0 and nf are the unique minimal
and maximal elements, respectively. We choose an arbitrary linearization of this partial
order. Since N has more than two atoms, this linearization begins with n0 and has some
second element, say n1 6= nf .
Since N is sound and since n1 does not depend on any prior atom except n0, some
occurrence sequence begins with an occurrence of n0 and a subsequent occurrence of n1.
So n0 has a result r0 such that (n0, r0) unconditionally enables n1.
Consider two cases:
• {n1} ( X(n0, p, r0) for some party p of n1.
Then n1, n2 ∈ X(n0, p, r0) for some atom n2 6= n1.
Since N is weakly deterministic, some deterministic agent q must be a party of all
atoms in X(n0, p, r0), and so in particular of n1 and n2.
Since (n0, r0) unconditionally enables n1 and q is deterministic, X(n0, q, r0) = {n1}.
So we have three distinct arcs (n0, p, r0, n1), (n0, p, r0, n2), and (n0, q, r0, n1) such
that X(n0, q, r0) = {n1}. Since N is sound, by Lemma 27 the useless arc rule can
be applied with n := n0, n
′ := n2, n′′ := n1.
• {n1} = X(n0, p, r0) for every party p of n1.
We claim that the shortcut rule or the useless arc rule can be applied. Assume N
does not satisfy the guard of the shortcut rule. Then, since (n0, r0) unconditionally
enables n1 and n1 6= nf , we have that (a) (n0, r0) does not have exclusive access
to n1, and (b) no outcome distinct from (n0, r0) commits to n1.
By (a), there exists an arc (n, p, r, n1) such that (n, r) 6= (n0, r0). Since n1 is the
second atom in the linearization, we have n = n0 and r 6= r0. So there exists an
arc (n0, p, r, n1).
By (b), there is an arc (n0, p, r, n2) for some atom n2 6= n1
Since N is weakly deterministic, some deterministic agent q is a party of all atoms
in X(n0, p, r
′). Moreover, by soundness, the unique atom in X(n0, q, r) must be
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one of them. We can assume without loss of generality that the atom is either n1
or n2.
If the atom is n1, then we have three distinct arcs (n0, p, r, n1), (n0, p, r, n2), and
(n0, q, r, n1) such that X(n0, q, r) = {n1}. By Lemma 27, the useless arc rule can
be applied with n := n0, n
′ := n2, and n′′ := n1.
If the atom is n2, then we have three distinct arcs (n0, p, r, n1), (n0, p, r, n2), and
(n0, q, r, n2) such that X(n0, q, r) = {n2}. Further, since (n0, r0) unconditionally
enables n1, there is a path from n0 to n1 that does not contain the arc (n0, p, r, n1).
By Lemma 27 the useless arc rule can be applied with n := n0, n
′ := n1, and
n′′ := n2.
(2) If N has exactly two atoms, it can be summarized (i.e., reduced to an equivalent
atomic negotiation).
In this case, the atoms of N are n0 and nf . Since the negotiation is sound, all results of
n0 have the same transition function. So the merge rule can be applied until n0 only has
one result. Then the shortcut rule can be applied with n = n0 and n
′ = nf to obtain an
equivalent atomic negotiation.
We can now conclude the proof. By the maximality of ρ and (1), ρ reduces N to a
negotiation containing at most two atoms. By (2), σ reduces N to an atomic negotiation.
As a corollary of Theorem 28 we obtain the completeness result:
Corollary 29. The shortcut rule, merge rule and useless arc rules are complete for
acyclic, weakly deterministic negotiations.
Figure 13 shows a weakly deterministic negotiation, which is a slightly modified version
of the Father-Daughter-Mother negotiation shown in Figure 13a: Daughter now has the
choice in n1 whether to ask her Father (and possibly later her mother) or to directly
ask her mother. Father thus has a nondeterministic edge to nf for the latter case. This
negotiation is sound, acyclic and weakly deterministic, and can therefore be summarized
by Theorem 29. The figure also illustrates the summarization of the negotiation.
We apply the merge rule twice to merge the results y and n of the atoms n2 and n3.
We call the merged results “yn”. The resulting negotiation is shown in Figure 13b.
Now we shortcut the result st of n0, which unconditionally enables n1 and has exclu-
sive access to it. The result st and the node n1 are removed, and two new results af
and am are added to n0, yielding the negotiation in Figure 13c.
In this negotiation, applying the useless arc rule to (n0, F, af) and (n0, D, af) removes
the arc (n0, F, af, nf ). Similarly, applying it to (n0, M, am) and (n0, D, am) removes the arc
(n0, M, am, nf ). We obtain the negotiation of Figure 13d.
Now the result am of n0 unconditionally enables n3, and the result am of n2 commits
to n3. So we can apply the shortcut rule, removing the result am of n0, and adding a
new result am yn. This yields the negotiation in Figure 13e.
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Figure 13: Example of the summary procedure
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The useless arc rule can be applied to (n0, F, am yn) and (n0, D, am yn), removing the
arc (n0, F, am yn, n2). After that, the result af of n0 unconditionally enables n2 and has
exclusive access to it. So we can apply the shortcut rule and remove n2. As n2 has two
results, yn and am, two new results af yn and af am are added to n0. We obtain the
negotiation of Figure 13f.
We can now apply the useless arc rule twice, once to (n0, M, af yn) and (n0, F, af yn),
and once to (n0, M, af am) and (n0, F, af am). The result is shown in Figure 13g.
Outcome af am of n0 unconditionally enables n3, and has exclusive access to it. After
the shortcut we obtain the negotiation of Figure 13h. Applying the merge rule to am yn,
af yn and af am yields a single result r of n0 (result in Figure 13i). A final application
of the shortcut rule to result r of n0, which unconditionally enables nf with exclusive
access, yields the summary of the initial negotiation.
5.1. Acyclic deterministic negotiations: Runtime analysis
Theorem 28 shows that every maximal reduction sequence is finite, but does not provide
any bound on its length. The family of negotiations shown at the top of Figure 14 shows
that the length of maximal reduction sequences can grow exponentially in the size of
the negotiation, even in the sound and deterministic case. Indeed, consider a sequence
of applications of the shortcut rule that always give priority to applications involving
the initial atom. The second negotiation of the figure shows the result of shortcutting
(n0, a) and (n1, a1) into a new outcome (n0, a a1), shortcutting (n0, a) and (n1, b1) into
a new outcome (n0, a b1), and removing n1. The third negotiation shows the result of
shortcutting (n0, a a1) and (n0, a b1) with the two outcomes of n2, after which n0 has
four outcomes. Proceeding in this way we generate 2k−1 different results for n0.
However, there is another maximal reduction sequence with only a polynomial number
of rule applications. At the second negotiation of the figure we first apply the shortcut
rule to (n0, a a1) and (n
1
1, a), and then to (n0, a b1) and (n
2
1, a). This yields two outcomes
that can be merged with the help of the merge rule, yielding a negotiation in which n0 has
again only one outcome. Proceeding in this way we completely reduce the negotiation
after only 5k + 1 rule applications.
The reason why the first reduction sequence “blows up” the negotiation is that an
application of the shortcut rule may actually increase the size of the negotiation. Indeed,
when the rule is applied to an outcome (n, r) that unconditionally enables an atom n′
with kl results for l > 1, then the rule removes the result r but adds l new results, and so
the total number of results increases. This problem is avoided by applying the shortcut
rule to an outcome only if the atom unconditionally enabled by it has one single result.
Definition 30. The deterministic shortcut rule, or d-shortcut rule, is defined by adding
to the guard of the shortcut rule in Definition 22 a new condition: n′ has at most one
result. (The action of the d-shortcut rule is identical to that of the shortcut rule.)
This reduction strategy corresponds to Algorithm 1, where R(N) denotes the set of
reducible outcomes of N (see Definition 25). The algorithm also gives priority to the
merge rule over the d-shortcut rule.
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Algorithm 1 Summarization algorithm for an acyclic negotiation N
1: while R(N) 6= ∅ do
2: if possible then apply the merge rule
3: else if possible then apply the d-shortcut rule
4: else stop and answer “unsound”
5: end if
6: N := negotiation obtained after the application of the rule
7: end while
In the rest of the section we prove that for an acyclic deterministic negotiation N
Algorithm 1 terminates after at most length K ·L rule applications, where K and L are
the number of atoms and the number of outcomes of N, respectively. Moreover, if N
is sound, then the algorithm returns an atomic negotiation. Whether such an efficient
reduction algorithm also exists for the weakly deterministic case is still open.
We first prove that Algorithm 1 terminates after at most K · L rule applications for
arbitrary acyclic negotiations. For this we introduce a measure that strictly decreases
when a rule is applied.
Definition 31. Let N be a negotiation, and let (n, r) be an outcome of N. A (n, r)-
sequence is a finite occurrence sequence that starts with (n, r) and satisfies Pn′ ⊆ Pn for
every atom occurring in σ. A (n, r)-sequence is maximal if it cannot be extended to a
longer (n, r)-sequence.
Fact 1. Let xn be the marking given by xn(p) = {n} if p ∈ Pn and xn(p) = ∅ otherwise.
A sequence σ is an (n, r)-sequence iff it starts with (n, r) and is enabled at xn. Moreover,
σ is maximal iff xn
σ−→ x for a marking x that enables no atom.
Definition 32. Let N be a negotiation and let (n, r) be an outcome of N. The index
of (n, r) in N is the length of a longest maximal (n, r)-sequence of N minus 1, if such
sequence exists, or∞, if N has arbitrarily long (n, r)-sequences. The index of N, denoted
by I(N), is the sum of the indices of all outcomes (n, r) such that n 6= nf .
Lemma 33. Let N be an acyclic negotiation, and let N′ be the result of applying the
merge or the d-shortcut rule to N. Then I(N′) < I(N).
Proof. If the merge rule is applied to merge two outcomes (n, r1) and (n, r2), then (n, r1)
and (n, r2) have the same index `, and I(N
′) = I(N)−`. Assume now that the d-shortcut
rule is applied to some outcome (n, r) of N, yielding a new outcome (n, rˆ). Since (n, rˆ)
is a shortcut, for every outcome (n′, r′) 6= (n, rˆ) appearing in both N and N′, the index
of (n′, r′) in N′ is smaller than or equal to the index of (n′, r′) in N. Moreover, we have
ˆ` = ` − 1, where ` and ˆ` are the indices of (n, r) in N and (n, rˆ) in N, respectively. So
I(N′) ≤ I(N)− `+ ˆ`< I(N), and we are done.
Proposition 34. Let N be an acyclic negotiation with K atoms and L outcomes. Every
maximal reduction sequence of N containing only applications of the merge and d-shortcut
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rules has length at most K ·L. In particular, Algorithm 1 terminates after at most K ·L
iterations of the while-loop.
Proof. By Lemma 33, and since I(N) ≥ 0 by definition, it suffices to show I(N) ≤ K ·L.
Since N is acyclic, every occurrence sequence fires an atom at most once. So the index
of any outcome of N is at most K − 1, and hence I(N) ≤ K · L.
In the rest of the section we prove that if N is acyclic, deterministic, and sound, then
Algorithm 1 completely reduces N, i.e., returns an atomic negotiation. The proof, which
is rather involved, proceeds in three steps. First, we show a technical lemma showing
that sound and deterministic acyclic negotiations can be reduced so that all agents
participate in every atom with more than one result (Lemma 35). Then we use this
result to prove that, loosely speaking, every sound and deterministic acyclic negotiation
can be reduced to a “replication” of a negotiation with only one agent (Lemma 37).
Intuitively, a replication is a one-agent negotiation in disguise: Even if the negotiation
has more than one agent, after each outcome they all move synchronously to the same
new atom. Figure 15 shows a one-agent negotiation and its replication to two agents. In
the third step, we show that the algorithm reduces replications to atomic negotiations.
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Figure 15: A one-agent negotiation and its replication to two agents.
The following lemma is proved in Appendix B:
Lemma 35. Let N be an irreducible sound and deterministic acyclic negotiation and let
n 6= nf be an atom of N with more than one result. Then every agent participates in n.
Now we formally define replications.
Definition 36. An outcome (n, r) is uniform if X(n, p, r) = X(n, p′, r) for every two
parties p, p′ ∈ Pn. A negotiation is a replication if all atoms have the same parties and
every outcome is uniform.
Observe that final outcomes (nf , r) are uniform because X(nf , p, r) = ∅ for every agent
p and result r. Moreover, if (n, r) is uniform and n 6= nf then there is a unique atom n′
such that X(n, p, r) = {n′} for every party p.
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Lemma 37. Let N be an irreducible sound and deterministic acyclic negotiation. Then
N is a replication.
Proof. We first show that every agent participates in every atom. By Lemma 35, it
suffices to prove that every atom n 6= nf has more than one result. Assume the contrary,
i.e., some atom different from nf has only one result. Since, by soundness, every atom
can occur, there is an initial occurrence sequence (n0, r0)(n1, r1) · · · (nk, rk) such that nk
has only one result and all of n0, . . . , nk−1 have more than one result. By Lemma 35, all
agents participate in all of n0, n1, nk−1. It follows that (ni, ri) unconditionally enables
(ni+1, ri+1) for every 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. In particular, (nk−1, rk−1) unconditionally enables
(nk, rk). But then, since nk has only one result, the d-shortcut rule can be applied to
nk−1, n, contradicting the hypothesis that N is irreducible.
For the second part, assume that some outcome (n, r) is not uniform. Then n 6= nf ,
and there are two distinct agents p1, p2 such that X(n, p1, r) = {n1} 6= {n2} = X(n, p2, r).
By the first part, every agent participates in n, n1 and n2. Since N is sound, some
reachable marking x enables n. Moreover, since all agents participate in n, and N is
deterministic, the marking x only enables n. Let x′ be the marking given by x
(n,r)−−−→ x′.
Since p1 participates in all atoms, no atom different from n1 can be enabled at x
′.
Symmetrically, no atom different from n2 can be enabled at x
′. So x′ does not enable
any atom, contradicting that N is sound.
Proposition 38. Let N be an irreducible sound and deterministic acyclic negotiation.
Then N is atomic.
Proof. Assume N contains more than one atom. For every atom n 6= nf , let l(n) be the
length of the longest path from n to nf in the graph of N. Let nmin be any atom such
that l(nmin) is minimal, and let r be an arbitrary result of nmin. By Lemma 37 there is
an atom n such that X(nmin, a, r) = {n} for every party p of nmin. If n 6= nf , then by
acyclicity we have l(n) < l(nmin), contradicting the minimality of nmin. So n = nf , and
therefore X(nmin, p, r) = {nf} for every result r of nmin and every party p. If nmin has
more than one result, then the merge rule is applicable. If nmin has one result, then,
since it unconditionally enables nf , the d-shortcut rule is applicable. In both cases we
get a contradiction to irreducibility.
Proposition 38 proves that every maximal reduction sequence that uses the merge and
d-shortcut rules leads to the same result: a summary of N.
Putting Proposition 34 and Proposition 38 together, we obtain our result:
Theorem 39. Let N be an acyclic, deterministic negotiation. Algorithm 1 terminates
after at most K ·L iterations of the while-loop, and returns an atomic negotiation iff N
is sound.
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6. Summarizing Deterministic Negotiations: The One-agent
Case
We have shown that any maximal reduction sequence for a sound and deterministic
acyclic negotiation that only applies the d-shortcut rule leads to a summary after a
finite, polynomial number of steps. The following examples show that this does not hold
for cyclic deterministic negotiations, not even for the degenerate case of negotiations
with one single agent.
n0
n1 n2
nf
Figure 16: A cyclic negotiation where every atom has two outcomes
A first problem is that in the cyclic case we can no longer restrict ourselves to the
d-shortcut rule. Consider the sound negotiation of Figure 16 3 Every atom has two
results, and so the d-shortcut rule cannot be applied. Since the merge and iteration
rules are not applicable either, the negotiation cannot be summarized unless we allow
to apply the shortcut rule in more generality.
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Figure 17: Shortcutting and cycles
A second problem is that in the cyclic case infinite reduction sequences are possible.
Consider the negotiation on the left of Figure 17. If we apply the shortcut rule to n0 and
the result leading to n1, we obtain the negotiation on the right. Applying the shortcut
3Since in the examples of this section the names of the results are not important, in all the figures we
omit them for clarity.
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rule to n0 and the result leading to n2, and then the merge rule, we obtain again the
negotiation on the left. This process can be repeated arbitrarily often.
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Figure 18: A removed result is produced again later on
To solve this problem, one could try the following policy: do not apply the shortcut
rule if it produces an arc that has already been removed by an earlier rule (intuitively,
we do not apply rules that “undo” reductions by earlier rule applications.) However,
this policy prevents the summarization of the sound negotiation on the left of Figure
18. We start by applying the d-shortcut rule to n0 and the result b, which yields the
negotiation in the middle of the figure. It is easy to see that this negotiation cannot
be summarized without generating again a result of n0 leading to n3. Indeed, after
shortcutting c and applying the iteration rule we get the negotiation on the right, where
after removing n1 and n2 with the shortcut rule we get a negotiation where n0 contains
again a result leading to n3. Other reduction sequences starting at the negotiation in
the middle also generate such a result. We therefore need a more sophisticated approach
for the summarization of cyclic deterministic negotiations. In this section we consider
the one-agent case, which already illustrates the main ideas. The general case is studied
in Section 7.
Let N = (N,n0, nf ,X) be an arbitrary deterministic negotiation with only one agent.
We first describe our summarization procedure, and then discuss its steps in more detail.
We use the negotiation of Figure 19 as example.
The summarization procedure is parameterized by a fixed but arbitrary total order ≺
on the atoms of the negotiation. In Figure 19 the order is 1 ≺ 2 ≺ · · · ≺ 6.
Using this order, we classify outcomes into backward and forward outcomes, and define
a total order on outcomes.
Definition 40. Let N be a negotiation with one single agent p. Let n
r−→ n′ denote
X(n, p, r) = {n′}. Abusing language, we call n r−→ n′ an outcome of N (instead of (n, r)).
An outcome n
r−→ n′ is backward if n′ 6= nf and n′ ≺ n. Otherwise it is forward. We
extend the order ≺ to a total order on outcomes, also denoted by ≺, as follows:
(n1
r1−→ n′1) ≺ (n2 r2−→ n′2) iff n′1 ≺ n′2 or n′1 = n′2 and n1 ≺ n2.
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Figure 19: A one-agent negotiation.
A backward outcome is minimal if no other backward outcome is strictly smaller with
respect to ≺.
In Figure 19 the only backward outcome is n4 −→ n1, which is also minimal. The
classification of outcomes into forward and backward is only defined for the one-agent
case; we will generalize it later.
Observe that every backward outcome n
r−→ n′ is reducible, because n′ 6= nf and
thus the shortcut rule can be applied to it. The summarization procedure is shown
in Algorithm 2. It gives priority to the merge and iteration rules, that is, they are
applied whenever possible. If neither of them can be applied, then the algorithm selects
a minimal backward outcome and applies the shortcut rule to it. If this is also not
possible, then the algorithm applies the d-shortcut rule to another outcome. We will see
that in this case the d-shortcut rule is necessarily applicable, and so that the algorithm
never gets stuck.
Notice that the algorithm never answers “not sound”. The reason is that all one-agent
negotiations are sound. Indeed, by definition every atom of a negotiation lies on a path
between the initial and final atoms, which in the one-agent case implies soundness.
Let us apply Algorithm 2 to the negotiation of Figure 19. In the first iteration of
the loop the algorithm shortcuts the only backward outcome n4 −→ n1, yielding the
negotiation on the left of Figure 20. This negotiation has two backward outcomes,
n4 −→ n2 and n4 −→ n3. Since n3 ≺ n2, the minimal backward outcome is n4 −→ n3. After
applying the shortcut rule to n4 −→ n3, a merge yields the negotiation in the middle
of the figure. In the third iteration, the algorithm shortcuts the only backward result
n4 −→ n2, yielding the negotiation on the right. An application of the iteration rule yields
an acyclic negotiation, which is reduced by applying the merge and d-shortcut rules.
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Algorithm 2 Summarization algorithm for an one-agent negotiation N
1: fix an arbitrary total order ≺ on the atoms of N
2: while R(N) 6= ∅ do
3: if possible then apply the merge rule
4: else if possible then apply the iteration rule
5: else if possible then apply the shortcut rule to a minimal backward outcome
6: else apply the d-shortcut rule
7: end if
8: N := negotiation obtained after the application of the rule
9: end while
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Figure 20: Reduction of the negotiation of Figure 19.
6.1. Termination and Runtime Analysis
We show that Algorithm 2 always terminates after at most 2K3+K2+L rule applications,
where K and L are the number of atoms and outcomes of the negotiation, respectively.
Moreover, the algorithm always returns a summary of the negotiation.
Let N be a one-agent negotiation, and let N1,N2, . . . be the sequence of negotiations
produced by Algorithm 2 starting from N1 := N, where each Ni+1 is obtained from Ni
by applying one of the rules. We call this sequence the computation of the algorithm on
N.
We start the proof with a lemma:
Lemma 41. Let N1,N2, . . . be the computation of Algorithm 2 on a one-agent negoti-
ation N. Let Nt1 and Nt2 be two negotiations of the computation to which Algorithm
2 applies the shortcut rule at line 5, and such such that t1 < t2. Let n1
r1−→ n′1 and
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n2
r2−→ n′2 be the outcomes of Nt1 and Nt2 to which the shortcut rule is applied. Then
(n1
r1−→ n′1) ≺ (n2 r2−→ n′2).
Proof. By the transitivity of ≺, it suffices to prove the result for the case in which the
algorithm does not apply the shortcut rule to a negotiation Ni with ti < i < t2.
If Nt1 contains some outcome n2
r−→ n′2, then, since n2 r2−→ n′2 is a backward outcome,
n2
r−→ n′2 is a backward outcome too. Since n1 r1−→ n′1 is the minimal backward outcome
of Nt1 , we have (n1
r1−→ n′1) ≺ (n2 r−→ n′2), and thus (n1 r1−→ n′1) ≺ (n2 r2−→ n′2).
Assume now that Nt1 does not contain any outcome from n2 to n
′
2. Since between
t1 + 1 and t2 − 1 the algorithm only applies the merge and iteration rules, and these
rules do not create any additional outcomes, n2
r2−→ n′2 is created by the application of
the shortcut rule to the outcome n1
r1−→ n′1 of Nt1 . By the definition of the shortcut rule,
it follows that n2 = n1 and that Nt1 contains an outcome n
′
1
r−→ n′2. If n′1 = n′2 then,
since the algorithm gives priority to the iteration rule over the shortcut rule, it would
not have applied the shortcut rule to n1
r1−→ n′1. So we have n′1 6= n′2.
If n′2 ≺ n′1 then n′1 r−→ n′2 is a backward outcome and by definition (n′1 r−→ n′2) ≺ (n1 r1−→
n′1). This contradicts the assumption that (n1
r1−→ n′1) is the minimal backward outcome
of Nt1 . So n
′
1 ≺ n′2, and thus (n1 r1−→ n′1) ≺ (n2 r2−→ n′2).
Theorem 42. If N has K atoms and L outcomes, then Algorithm 2 terminates after at
most 2K3 +K2 + L rule applications, and it summarizes N.
Proof. Let N1,N2, . . . be the computation of Algorithm 2 on N. We divide it into two
phases. Phase I terminates immediately before the first execution of line 6. Phase II
starts with the first execution of line 6 and continues until the end of the computation.
We show that phase I and phase II terminate after at most K3 + K2 + L and K3 rule
applications, respectively.
By Lemma 41, if during phase I of the computation the algorithm applies the shortcut
rule to two outcomes (n1
r1−→ n′1) and (n2 r2−→ n′2), then (n1 r1−→ n′1) ≺ (n2 r2−→ n′2). In
particular, this implies n1 6= n′1 or n2 6= n′2. So the number of applications of the shortcut
rule during phase I is bounded by the number of pairs of atoms, i.e., by K2.
Since the algorithm gives priority to the merge and iteration rules over the shortcut
rule, it only applies the shortcut rule to negotiations having at most one result between
any pair of nodes. Therefore, if the shortcut rule is applied to n
r−→ n′, then the atom n′
has at most K outcomes, and so the rule generates at most K new outcomes. It follows
that in phase I the merge and iteration rules are applied at most K times between two
consecutive applications of the shortcut rule, and also after the last application of the
shortcut rule. Further, since every application removes one outcome, before the first
application of the shortcut rule merge and iteration are applied together at most L
times. So the total number of applications of the merge and iteration rules during phase
I is bounded by L + K2 ·K = L + K3, and the overall total number of applications is
bounded by K3 +K2 + L.
Let Nt be the first negotiation of phase II of the computation, i.e., the first negotiation
to which the d-shortcut rule is applied at line 6. By the definition of the algorithm, Nt
40
has only forward outcomes. We prove that during phase II the algorithm applies at most
K3 rules. We need two preliminary claims.
Claim 1. Nt is acyclic.
If n
r−→ n, then the iteration rule can be applied to Nt, a contradiction. If Nt contains
a cycle with at least two atoms, then the cycle contains at least one result n
r−→ n′ such
that n  n′. Since nf does not belong to any cycle, we have n′ 6= nf , and so n r−→ n′ is
backward, again a contradiction.
Claim 2. During phase II the algorithm only applies the merge, iteration, and d-
shortcut rules.
Follows easily from the fact that the application of the shortcut rule to a negotiation that
has only forward outcomes leads to another negotiation satisfying the same property. So
Nt′ contains only forward results for t
′ > t. By the definition of the algorithm, line 5 is
never executed, and we are done.
These two claims allow us to apply Proposition 34. We conclude that the length of
the sequence of rules applied by the algorithm from Nt is bounded by Kt ·Lt, where Kt
and Lt are the number of atoms and non-final outcomes of Nt. Clearly we have Kt ≤ K.
Further, since neither the merge nor the iteration rule can be applied to Nt, for every two
atoms n, n′ of N there is at most one outcome n r−→ n′. and so Lt ≤ K2. So Kt ·Lt ≤ K3,
and we are done.
It remains to show that Algorithm 2 summarizes N, i.e., that it eventually reaches
an atomic negotiation. It suffices to look at the suffix of the sequence starting with Nt.
By Claim 1, Nt is acyclic. Further, since Nt has one agent and every atom of Nt lies
on a path between the initial and the final atoms, Nt is sound. By Proposition 38, the
algorithm summarizes Nt.
6.1.1. Extension to Replications
Recall that a replication is a negotiation whose atoms have all the same parties, and
whose outcomes are all uniform, that is, for every result all parties move together to the
same atom (see Definition 36). Algorithm 2 also works for replications. Indeed, in order
to summarize a replication, we just apply the same sequence of rules that we would
apply if all atoms had only one party. By Theorem 42, we obtain:
Theorem 43. Algorithm 2 summarizes a replication N with K atoms and L outcomes
after at most 2K3 +K2 + L rule applications.
While this extension is straightforward, it is important because such negotiations will
appear at intermediate stages of our general summarization algorithm.
7. Summarizing Deterministic Negotiations with Multiple
Agents
We present a reduction algorithm for deterministic negotiations and show that it sum-
marizes every sound deterministic negotiation with K atoms and L outcomes after at
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most 2K3 +K2 +KL+ L rule applications.
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Figure 21: A sound deterministic negotiation.
7.1. Informal description
We give a first overview of the summarization procedure using the sound deterministic
negotiation of Figure 21 as example.
The procedure is based on the notion of the fragment of a negotiation generated by
an atom. A fragment is almost a negotiation, with the only difference that the final
atom may be missing, and so there may be “dangling outcomes”. For example, in the
negotiation of Figure 21 the fragment generated by n1 is highlighted in red, and (n4, a)
is a “dangling outcome”. Intuitively, the fragment generated by an atom n is the part
of the negotiation that can occur from the marking x satisfying x(p) = {n} for every
party of n, and x(p) = ∅ otherwise.
The procedure first summarizes all one-agent fragments, i.e., all fragments generated
by atoms with one party, then all two-agent fragments, and so on. Figure 22 shows on
the left the one-agent fragments of the negotiation, and on the right the result of the
reduction: The fragments generated by n2 and n5 are already summarized, and thus do
not change, while the fragment generated by n6 (which coincides with the fragment of
n7) is summarized into atom n67. In the second stage the procedure summarizes the
fragments of the atoms n1 and n8 (see Figure 23, where the fragments are drawn using
different colors for clarity). Notice that the fragments generated by n1, n3, and n4 are
identical. The fragment of n8 is atomic, while the fragment for n1 is summarized into
n15. The only three-agent fragment of the resulting negotiation is the negotiation itself,
and after the third step the negotiation is completely summarized.
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Figure 22: Before and after reducing one-agent fragments.
The procedure to reduce a fragment is illustrated in Figure 24. On the left we see
the fragment of the negotiation of Figure 21 generated by the atom n1, with a “mock”
final atom nˆ1 for the dangling outcome. The procedure first removes all atoms with
fewer agents than n1, in this case n2 and n5. In this example this is achieved by two
applications of the shortcut rule, and it yields the negotiation in the middle of the figure.
This negotiation is nothing but the replication of the one-agent negotiation shown on
the right of the figure: The two agents behave identically. We reduce this replication by
means of the same sequence of rules we would use to reduce its one-agent counterpart.
Observe that, while Figure 24 shows the fragment separated from the rest of the
negotiation, the sequence of rules applied to summarize the fragment can also be applied
to the negotiation of Figure 21. The sequence produces the same effect, and eventually
replaces the fragment by one single atom. It has no side-effects.
What happens if the summarization procedure is applied to an unsound deterministic
negotiation? Since the rules preserve unsoundness, the procedure does not summarize
the negotiation. It may not terminate, or terminate after a very large number of rule
applications. Notice, however, that we can still use the algorithm to decide soundness
in polynomial time. Indeed, if after 2K3 +K2 +KL+L rule applications the procedure
has not summarized the negotiation, then we know that it will never do, and that the
initial negotiation is unsound. We discuss this point in more detail later.
In Appendix C.1 we obtain some preliminary results. We study loops, which are
occurrence sequences leading from a marking to itself. We prove a lemma which turns
out to be fundamental for the sequel: The loops of sound deterministic negotiations
contain a “synchronizing” atom involving all parties of all atoms in the loop. In Section
7.2 we formally define the fragment of a negotiation generated by an atom. We also
define the segment generated by an outcome, and prove a second fundamental result:
The fragments and segments of sound and deterministic negotiations are also sound
negotiations. Section 7.3 describes the summarization algorithm for the sound case.
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Figure 23: Before and after reducing two-agent fragments.
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Figure 24: Reducing a fragment.
Sections 7.4 and 7.5 analyze its behavior. Section 7.6 provides the algorithm for the
general case in which the negotiation can be sound or unsound.
7.2. Fragments and Segments
We show that every atom n and every outcome (n, r) of a sound deterministic negotiation
induces a “sound subnegotiation” of N, called the n-fragment and the (n, r)-segment of
N, respectively.
In Definition 31 we introduced (n, r)-sequences. Loosely speaking, a (n, r)-sequence
is a finite occurrence sequence that starts with (n, r) and can be executed by the parties
of n on their own, without involving any other agent. We now come back to this notion.
Definition 44. A sequence of outcomes is a n-sequence if it is a (n, r)-sequence for some
result r of n. A n-sequence is maximal if it cannot be extended to a longer n-sequence.
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A (n, r)-sequence is strict if every atom n′ that appears in it after the first outcome
(n, r) satisfies Pn′ ⊂ Pn. A strict (n, r)-sequence is maximal if it cannot be extended to
a longer strict (n, r)-sequence.
Let xn be the marking given by xn(p) = {n} if p ∈ Pn and xn(p) = ∅ otherwise. The
target of a (n, r)-sequence σ is the marking reached by firing σ from xn.
The sequences (n6, a) (n7, a) and (n6, a) (n7, b) (n6, b) of the negotiation shown in Fig-
ure 21 are maximal n6-sequences, but not strict (n6, a)-sequences. Calling the agents of
the negotiation A, B, and C, the target of all these sequences is the marking x given
by x(A) = x(B) = ∅ and x(C) = {n8}. The sequence (n1, a) (n2, a) is a maximal strict
(n1, a)-sequence, but not a maximal n1-sequence. The sequence (n3, a) (n4, a) is a maxi-
mal n3-sequence, and its target is the marking x
′ given by x′(A) = {nf}, x′(B) = {n8},
and x′(C) = ∅.
Appendix C provides a proof of the proposition below, stating that, for every atom n
of a sound deterministic negotiation, all maximal n-sequences have the same target. In
our example, the markings x and x′ above are the targets of all maximal n6-sequences
and all maximal n2-sequences, respectively. The same property holds for the strict
(n, r)-sequences too.
Proposition 45. Let N be a sound and deterministic negotiation, and let n be an atom
of N.
(a) All maximal n-sequences have the same target.
That is: there is a unique marking x such that xn
σ−→ x for every maximal n-
sequence σ. We call x the target of n.
(b) For every outcome (n, r), all maximal strict (n, r)-sequences have the same target.
That is: there is a unique marking x such that xn
σ−→ x for every maximal strict
(n, r)-sequence σ. We call x the target of (n, r).
While the proof of this proposition is surprisingly non-trivial, there is a clear intuition
for it. After a maximal n-sequence, the agents of Pn have to interact with agents of A\Pn
in order to reach the final marking, and these agents have to be ready for the interaction,
otherwise a deadlock would arise. If maximal n-sequences can lead to different targets,
then, since the agents of A \ Pn do not know which target will be chosen by the agents
of Pn, they must be ready to engage in different atoms. But this is not possible, because
in a deterministic negotiation an agent is always committed to at most one atom.
Proposition 45 allows us to define the fragments of sound deterministic negotiations.
Definition 46. Let N = (N,n0, nf ,X) be a sound and deterministic negotiation. Let
n be an atom of N, and let tgt(n) be its target. The n-fragment of N is the tuple
Fn = (Fn, n, nˆ,Xn) defined as follows:
• Fn contains the atoms occurring in the n-sequences of N, plus a fresh atom nˆ. This
atom nˆ has the same parties as n, and it has one single result rˆ.
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• For every atom n′ ∈ Fn, party p and result r:
Xn(n
′, p, r) =

∅ if n′ = nˆ and r = rˆ
nˆ if X(n′, p, r) = tgt(n)
X(n′, p, r) otherwise
The n-fragment of N is atomic if Fn = {n, nˆ} and n has exactly one result.
Let (n, r) be an outcome of N, and let tgt(n, r) be its target. The (n, r)-segment
of N is the tuple S(n,r) = (S(n,r), n, nˆ,X(n,r)) defined exactly as the n-fragment above,
but replacing the n-sequences by the strict (n, r)-sequences of N. Atomic segments are
defined like atomic fragments.
The n1-fragment of the negotiation of Figure 21 is shown on the left of Figure 24.
Observe that this is also the n3-fragment and the n4-fragment. The segments of the
outcomes contained in the n1-fragment are all atomic, except the segments of (n1, a)
and of (n4, b).
We show that the fragments and segments of sound deterministic negotiations are
also sound. This result allows us to summarize sound negotiations “inside-out”: first
summarize the fragments for agents with one party, then for agents with two parties,
and so on.
Proposition 47. Let N = (N,n0, nf ,X) be a sound and deterministic negotiation.
(1) For every atom n, the n-fragment Fn of N is a sound and deterministic negotiation.
(2) For every outcome (n, r), the (n, r)-segment of N is a sound and deterministic
negotiation.
Proof. We prove the result for the n-fragment Fn, the proof for the (n, r)-segment is
analogous. Observe first that, by the definition of n- and (n, r)-sequences, every agent
of an atom of Fn is also an agent of n, and so Fn is indeed a negotiation.
For soundness, observe first that every atom of Fn is executable: If n
′ belongs to Fn,
then by definition some n-sequence contains n, and this sequence is also a sequence of
Fn.
Now let σ be an occurrence sequence of Fn. Then σ is also an n-sequence of N, and
it can be extended to a maximal n-sequence στ . By Proposition 45 we have xn
σ τ−−→ xnˆ
in Fn, and so xn
σ τ (nˆ,rˆ)−−−−−→ xf .
Corollary 48. A deterministic negotiation is sound iff all its fragments and segments
are sound.
Proof. One direction follows immediately from Proposition 47. For the other, it suffices
to observe that, since every agent is a party of the initial atom, the fragment of the
initial atom is the complete negotiation.
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Algorithm 3 Summarization algorithm for a sound deterministic negotiation N
1: fix an arbitrary order ≺ on the atoms of N
2: for k = 1 to A do
3: while R(N, k) 6= ∅ do
4: if possible then
5: apply the merge rule to some outcome of R(N, k)
6: else if possible then
7: apply the iteration rule to some outcome of R(N, k)
8: else if possible then
9: apply the d-shortcut rule to some non-uniform outcome of R(N, k)
10: else if possible then
11: apply the shortcut rule to a backward uniform outcome of R(N, k)
12: which is minimal w.r.t. ≺
13: else
14: apply the d-shortcut rule to some outcome of R(N, k)
15: end if
16: N := negotiation obtained after the application of the rule to N
17: end while
18: end for
7.3. The Summarization Algorithm
We first present Algorithm 3, an algorithm that summarizes a deterministic negotiation
under the premise that it is sound. The general case is considered in Section 7.6. Al-
gorithm 3 is a generalization of Algorithm 2 for one-agent negotiations. We start by
explaining the meaning of R(N, k) in line 3 and backward outcome in line 11.
In the one-agent case all atoms have only one and thus the same number of parties.
Now this is no longer the case, and to cope with this the new algorithm proceeds in
stages. During the k-th stage the algorithm only applies rules to outcomes (n, r) such
that n has k parties.
Definition 49. An outcome (n, r) is k-reducible if it is reducible and n has k parties.
The set of k-reducible outcomes of N is denoted R(N, k).
Backward outcomes were introduced in Definition 40 for one-agent negotiations: An
outcome n
r−→ n′ is backward if n′ 6= nf and n′ ≺ n. In the many-agent case we may
have X(n, p1, r) = {n′} and X(n, p2, r) = {n′′} for n′′ 6= n′, and so not even the notation
n
r−→ n′ makes sense. But it does make sense when X(n, p, r) = {n′} for every party p
of n, i.e., for uniform outcomes (recall Definition 36). So we write n
r7→ n′ to denote
that (n, r) is uniform and that X(n, p, r) = {n′} holds for each p ∈ Pn, and generalize
Definition 40 as follows:
Definition 50. A uniform outcome n
r7→ n′ is backward if n′ 6= nf and n′ ≺ n. We
extend the order ≺ to an order on uniform outcomes as in Definition 40.
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There is another difference between Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 2. The if -command
of lines 4-13 contains a new clause, which concerning the shortcut rule gives preference
to non-uniform outcomes over uniform ones. To understand the reason for this, consider
the fragment on the left of Figure 24. The non-uniform outcomes are (n1, a) and (n4, b).
By giving them priority, we eliminate from this n1-fragment all atoms with strictly fewer
parties than n1 and “make the fragment uniform”.
The algorithm indeed summarizes the negotiation of Figure 21 in the way sketched
at the beginning of the section. We choose the order ≺ given by the numbering of the
atoms. During the execution of the while-loop for k = 1 the algorithm executes lines
5,7, and 11 to yield the negotiation on the right of Figure 22. The execution for k = 2
begins with applications of the d-shortcut rule to the non-uniform outcomes (n1, a), and
(n4, b) in line 9, which removes the atoms n2 and n5. After that, lines 5, 7, and 11 are
executed to yield the negotiation on the right of Figure 23. Finally, the execution for
k = 3 applies the d-shortcut rule in line 9 several times, removing the atoms n15, n67,
and n8, and leaving a negotiation with only the atoms n0 and nf . A final execution of
line 13 finishes the summarization.
We conclude the section with a small lemma. Observe that the algorithm forbids to
first apply a reduction to a k-reducible outcome and then to a k′-reducible outcome
where k′ < k. This may seem dangerous: In principle, rule applications to k-reducible
outcomes might produce new k′-reducible outcomes, and the algorithm would not be able
to “use” these outcomes for further reductions. The following lemma shows that this is
not the case.
Lemma 51. Let N be a negotiation without k-reducible outcomes for any k ≤ K, and
let N′ be obtained from N by an arbitrary sequence of reductions. Then N′ also has no
k-reducible outcomes for any k ≤ K.
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to prove the result for sequences of length 1. Assume the
sequence applies a rule to a reducible outcome (n, r). Then n has more than k parties.
If the rule is the iteration rule, then every reducible outcome of N′ was already a reducible
outcome of N, and we are done. In the case of the merge and shortcut rules, the only
outcomes that might be reducible in N′ but not in N are those added as a consequence
of the rule. But these are outcomes of n, which has more than k parties.
This lemma already can be used to show that Algorithm 3 summarizes all sound and
deterministic acyclic negotiations. Assume this is not the case. By Proposition 34 such
a negotiation is reducible by any maximal sequence of applications of the merge and
d-shortcut rules, in particular by any in which we always choose a reducible outcome
with a minimal number of parties for the next rule application, and within those we
give preference to the merge over the shortcut rule. By Lemma 51, if k < k′ then such
sequences never choose a k′-reducible outcome and then later a k-reducible one, and so
the algorithm executes one of them.
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7.4. Completeness
We prove a proposition at the core of our completeness result which states that Algo-
rithm 3 summarizes all sound deterministic negotiations. Intuitively, the proposition
shows that the algorithm summarizes the negotiation “inside-out”, meaning that after
k iterations of the for-loop all fragments for atoms with k parties have been summa-
rized. Intuitively, the proof shows that before the kth iteration all the segments of these
fragments are acyclic, and that the k-iteration performs the following two steps:
• Summarize all these segments using the merge and d-shortcut rules. This trans-
forms the fragments into replications.
• Summarize the replications using Algorithm 2.
Proposition 52. Let N be a sound deterministic negotiation, and assume Algorithm 3
terminates for input N. For every k ≥ 0, let Nk be the negotiation produced by Algorithm
3 after k iterations of the for-loop.
(1) For every atom n of N with at most k parties, the n-fragment of Nk is atomic.
(2) For every outcome (n, r) of N with at most k+ 1 parties, the (n, r)-segment of Nk
is acyclic.
Proof. We prove (1) and (2) simultaneously by induction on k. If k = 0 then (2) is
vacuously true. For (1) just observe that if n has one party then the only (n, r)-sequence
is (n, r), and so the (n, r) segment is acyclic.
Assume now k > 0, and let n be an atom of Nk with ` ≤ k parties. We prove (1) in
four steps.
Claim 1. All segments of the n-fragment are acyclic.
By the definition of a fragment, every atom of the n-fragment of Nk+1 has at most `
parties. By induction hypothesis on (2), all segments of the n-fragment of Nk are acyclic,
and therefore the same holds for Nk+1.
Claim 2. All segments of the n-fragment are atomic.
By Theorem 47, the segments are sound and deterministic. Moreover, since every atom
of a segment has at most ` parties and no outcome with at most k−1 parties is reducible,
all segments are irreducible. By Claim 1 and Proposition 38, all segments are atomic.
Claim 3. The n-fragment is a replication.
Since every segment is atomic, all atoms of the n-fragment have the same set of parties
as n. Now let (n′, r′) be an outcome of the n-fragment. By Claim 2 the (n′, r′)-segment
is atomic, and so in the negotiation Nk we have xn′
(n′,r′)−−−−→ x for a marking x such that
either x = xn′′ for some atom n
′′ with the same parties as n′, or x does not enable any
atom. In the first case we have n′ r
′7→ n′′, and we are done. In the second case, by the
definition of a segment we have n′ r
′7→ nˆ.
Claim 4. The n-fragment is atomic.
Assume the n-fragment is not atomic. Then by Claim 3 and Theorem 43 the n-fragment
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has at least one reducible outcome, and the outcome has ` ≤ k parties. This contradicts
the hypothesis that the minimal reducible outcome has k + 1 parties.
Now we proceed to prove (2). Let (n, r) be an outcome of N with at most k + 1
parties. Assume that the (n, r)-segment is cyclic. By Theorem 47, the segment is sound
and deterministic. By Proposition 62, the segment has a loop, and by Proposition 64,
proved in the Appendix, the loop has a synchronizer s. By the definition of a segment,
s is neither the initial atom n nor the final atom of the segment. Since, by definition,
every atom of the (n, r)-segment different from the initial and final atoms has strictly
fewer parties than n, we get |Ps| ≤ k. By induction hypothesis on (1), the s-fragment is
atomic. But this contradicts that s is a synchronizer.
Theorem 53. Algorithm 3 summarizes every sound deterministic negotiation N.
Proof. Let K be the number of agents of N. By Theorem 47, after termination the
n0-fragment is atomic. It follows that N
K is atomic, and we are done.
7.5. Runtime Analysis
It is easy to give a O(K4 +KL) bound for the number of rule applications of Algorithm
3. Indeed, since each n-fragment can be summarized using at most 2K3 + K2 + L
applications and the negotiation has K atoms, the bound follows.
We obtain a better, O(K3 + KL) bound. The key observation is that, for a given
number k, the fragments of the atoms with k parties may share nodes. Consider for
instance the negotiation of Figure 25, and take k = 1. The three atoms with one party are
n1, n2, and n5. The fragments Fn1 and Fn2 share the nodes n3 and n4. Therefore, adding
the number of rule applications needed to summarize the three fragments separately gives
us a very crude bound.
We define the k-fragment of N as, loosely speaking, the union of all the n-frgamnets
for all atoms n with exactly k parties. In Figure 25 the 1-fragment of N is shown at the
bottom, on the right. We now formally define the k-fragment of a sound deterministic
negotiation, and give a bound on the number of rule applications needed to summarize
it.
Definition 54. Let N = (N,n0, nf ,X) be a deterministic sound negotiation. Let N
i be
the set of atoms of N with exactly i parties. For every n ∈ Ni, let Fn = (Fn, n, nˆ,Xn)
be the n-fragment, with the fresh final atoms {nˆ | n ∈ Ni} chosen in such a way that
nˆ1 = nˆ2 holds for any two atoms n1, n2 ∈ N i satisfying Pn1 = Pn2 (i.e., the fragments
of two atoms have the same final atom iff they have the same parties).
The i-fragment of N is the pre-negotiation Fi = (F,Xi) defined as follows
• F = ⋃n∈N i Fn
• for every n ∈ F , p ∈ Pn, r ∈ Rn: Xi(n, p, r) = Xn′(n, p, r), where n′ is any atom
with i parties such that n ∈ Fn′.
The k-fragment is summarized if Xi(n, p, r) 6= ∅ implies that n ∈ Ni and Xi(n, p, r) =
{nˆ}.
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Figure 25: A sound deterministic negotiation, its three one-party fragments, and their
combination into the 1-fragment.
Lemma 55. Let N be a sound deterministic negotiation. Let Fi be the i-fragment of N,
and let K and L be the number of nodes and outcomes of Fi. If Fi is a replication, then
Algorithm 2 summarizes Ni after at most 2K3 +K2 + L rule applications.
Proof. By the correspondence between replications and one-agent (pre-)negotiations, it
suffices to prove the result for i = 1. The proof is exactly as the proof of Theorem 42.
Indeed, an inspection shows that the proof does not use the fact that a negotiation has
one single initial atom. The only point that has to be slightly adapted appears at the
very end of the proof: A negotiation with only the initial and final atom can be reduced
to an atomic negotiation. On the contrary, a pre-negotiation with multiple initial atoms
and one final atom cannot, because the shortcut rule cannot be applied. However, this
is only a technicality, because the final atoms are atoms added artificially to give a
destination to “dangling outcomes”.
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Theorem 56. Let N be a sound deterministic negotiation with K atoms, and L out-
comes. Algorithm 3 terminates after at most 2K3 +K2 +KL+ L rule applications.
Proof. For every i ≥ 1 let ki and `i be the number of atoms and outcomes of the
atoms n and outcomes (n, r) such that n has exactly i parties, respectively. Further, let
Ki =
∑i
j=1 kj and Li =
∑i
j=1 `j . We have Ki+1 = Ki + ki+1 and Li+1 = Li + `i+1 for
every i ≥ 1.
We prove that for every i ≥ 1 the i-th iteration of the for-loop terminates after at
most 2K3i +K
2
i +KiLi + Li rule applications. We proceed by induction on i.
Case i = 1. During the first iteration of the loop the algorithm summarizes the 1-
fragment of N, and so the result follows by Lemma 55.
Case i > 1. By induction hypothesis, the (i–1)-th iteration of the for-loop has termi-
nated after at most 2K3i−1 + K
2
i−1 + Ki−1Li−1 + Li−1 rule applications. Let N
i−1 be
the negotiation obtained after the (i–1)-th iteration. By Proposition 52, the fragments
of Ni−1 for atoms with at most i− 1 parties are atomic, and the segments of outcomes
with at most i parties are acyclic.
Claim. We claim that after further Ki`i rule applications all segments for atoms with
at most i parties are not only acyclic but also atomic.
Consider a non-atomic (n, r)-segment such that n has at most i parties. If n has less
than i parties, then the n-fragment is atomic, and the claim follows. So assume that n
has exactly i parties. By definition all atoms of the (n, r)-segment different from n have
less than i parties. We have:
(1) (n, r) unconditionally enables some atom with fewer parties than n, that is, (n, r)
is non-uniform.
Otherwise the (n, r)-segment is not sound, contradicting the soundness of N.
(2) The index of the (n, r)-segment is equal to or smaller than its number of atoms.
Recall that the index of an outcome (n′, r′) in the (n, r)-segment is the length of a
longest maximal (n′, r′)-sequence, and the index of the (n, r)-segment is the sum
of the indices of its atoms (Definition 32). Since the (n, r)-segment is acyclic, the
index of (n, r) is at most the number of atoms of the segment minus 1. Consider
now any other outcome (n′, r′) of the (n, r)-segment. Then n′ 6= n, and so n′ has
fewer parties than n. But then the (n′, r′)-segment is atomic, which implies that
the index of (n′, r′) is 0. So the total index of the segment is at most equal to its
number of atoms.
By (1), the algorithm keeps choosing non-uniform outcomes of the segments with i
parties, until there are no more non-uniform atoms. At this point, all (n, r)-segments
are irreducible, and by Proposition 38 atomic. Since there at most `i segments, each of
them with at most Ki atoms, by (2) and Lemma 33 the segments become atomic after
at most Ki · `i rule applications. This finishes the proof of the claim.
Let Nˆ i−1 be the negotiation obtained after the sequence of Ki ·`i rule applications. By
the claim, the fragments of atoms of Nˆ i−1 with (i−1) parties and the segments of atoms
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with i parties are atomic. It follows that the outcomes of Nˆ i−1 that have exactly i parties
are uniform. As shown in Claim 3 in the proof of Proposition 52, this implies that all
fragments for atoms with i parties are replications. So the complete i-fragment of Nˆ i−1
has at most ki atoms and `i outcomes. By Lemma 55, the i-fragment is summarized
after at most 2k3i + k
2
i + `i rule applications.
So we obtain that the i-th iteration of the for-loop terminates after at most
(2K3i−1 +K
2
i−1 +Ki−1Li−1 + Li−1) +Ki`i + (2k
3
i + k
2
i + `i)
iterations. Now, using Ki = Ki−1 + ki and Li = Li−1 + `i, we get:
(2K3i−1 +K
2
i−1 +Ki−1Li−1 + Li−1) +Ki · `i + (2k3i + k2i + `i)
= 2(K3i−1 + k
3
i ) + (K
2
i−1 + k
2
i ) + (Ki−1Li−1 +Ki · `i) + (Li−1 + `i)
≤ 2(Ki−1 + ki)3 + (Ki−1 + ki)2 +Ki(Li−1 + `i) + (Li−1 + `i)
= 2K3i +K
2
i +KiLi + Li
and we are done.
7.6. The Unsound Case
Algorithm 4 assumes that its input is a sound deterministic negotiation. It is easy to
transform it into an algorithm for arbitrary deterministic negotiations, with the same
complexity. The algorithm is shown as Algorithm 4. If the input negotiation is sound,
Algorithm 4 algorithm summarizes it, and otherwise it answers “unsound”. The al-
gorithm counts the number of rule applications and answers “unsound” if the counter
exceeds 2K3 +K2 +KL+L. This is correct by Theorem 56. The algorithm also reports
“unsound” if it reaches an irreducible but non-atomic net, or if it can only apply the
shortcut rule to non-uniform or uniform forward outcomes.
7.7. A Correction
In [ED14] we claimed that the merge, iteration, and shortcut rule were complete for sound
deterministic negotiations, and presented a reduction algorithm. While the completeness
result holds, the algorithm of [ED14] is unfortunately incorrect. The algorithm is based
on a lemma (lemma number 3 in [ED14]), which, rewritten in the terminology of this
paper, states:
Lemma 57 (Incorrect Lemma 3 of [ED14]). A cyclic sound deterministic negotiation
N contains an atom n such that all loops of the n-fragment of N contain n.
This lemma was used in [ED14] to prove the correctness of the summarization pro-
cedure that iterates the following three steps. First: identify an n-fragment satisfying
the property stated in the lemma. Second: use the procedure for summarizing acyclic
negotiations to reduce this n-fragment to a single atom, with possibly some self-loop
outcomes (i.e., outcomes (n, r) such that X(n, a, r) = n for every party a of n). Third,
use the iteration rule to remove such outcomes.
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Algorithm 4 Summarization algorithm for arbitrary deterministic negotiations
1: fix an arbitrary order ≺ on the atoms of N
2: counter := 0
3: for k = 1 to A do
4: while R(N, k) 6= ∅ and counter ≤ 2K3 +K2 +KL+ L do
5: if possible then
6: apply the merge rule to some outcome of R(N, k)
7: else if possible then
8: apply the iteration rule to some outcome of R(N, k)
9: else if possible then
10: apply the d-shortcut rule to some non-uniform outcome of R(N, k)
11: else if possible then
12: apply the shortcut rule to a backward uniform outcome of R(N, k)
13: minimal w.r.t. ≺
14: else if possible then
15: apply the d-shortcut rule to some outcome of R(N, k)
16: else stop and answer “unsound”
17: end if
18: N := negotiation obtained after the application of the rule to N
19: counter := counter + 1
20: end while
21: end for
22: if N is not atomic then answer “unsound”
23: end if
However, the lemma is wrong. Figure 26 shows a one-agent negotiation in which,
for every atom n, the n-fragment contains a loop which does not contain n. As a
consequence, the algorithm of [ED14] does not summarize this negotiation.
In this paper we have corrected this mistake. The procedure of Section 6 correctly
summarizes the negotiation of Figure 26.
8. Conclusion
We have introduced negotiations, a formal model of concurrency with atomic negotia-
tions (a form of synchronized choice) as primitive. We have defined and studied two
important analysis problems: soundness, which coincides with the soundness notion for
workflow nets, and the new summarization problem. We have provided a complete set
of reduction rules for sound deterministic negotiations, and we have shown that, when
applied following a simple strategy, the rules allow one to compute a summary of a sound
deterministic negotiations with a polynomial number of rule applications.
The reduction algorithm is based on several results about the structure of deterministic
negotiations that have independent interest. Proposition 64 and its syntactic counter-
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Figure 26: Counterexample to Lemma 3 of [ED14].
part, Proposition 68, are important results about the structure of loops. Proposition 45
shows that every sound deterministic negotiation is necessarily organized composition-
ally.
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A. Appendix: Complexity of Soundness
Theorem 10. The soundness problem is PSPACE-complete. For acyclic negotiations,
the problem is co-NP-hard and in DP (and so at level ∆P2 of the polynomial hierarchy).
Proof. The soundness problem is in PSPACE.
Membership in PSPACE could be proved by observing that the soundness problem can be
formulated in CTL, and then applying the PSPACE algorithm for CTL and 1-safe Petri
nets of [Esp96]. This algorithm only assumes that, given a marking, one can compute
a successor marking in polynomial time, which is the case both for Petri nets and for
negotiations. However, since we only need a very special case of the CTL algorithm, we
provide a self-contained proof.
We show that both conditions for soundness can be checked in nondeterministic poly-
nomial space. The result then follows from Savitch’s theorem (NPSPACE=PSPACE).
The first condition is: every atom is enabled at some reachable marking. For this we
consider each atom n in turn, and guess step by step an occurrence sequence ending with
an occurrence of n. This only requires to store the marking reached by the sequence
executed so far.
The second condition is: every occurrence sequence from the initial marking is either
a large step or can be extended to a large step. This case is a bit more involved. Let S
denote the problem of checking this second condition. We prove S ∈ PSPACE.
(1) The following problem is in PSPACE: given some marking x, check that no occur-
rence sequence starting at x ends with the final atom.
Let us call this problem NO-OCC. We have NO-OCC ∈ NPSPACE, because we can
nondeterministically guess an occurrence sequence starting at x that ends with the
final atom (we guess one step at a time). Since NPSPACE=PSPACE=co-PSPACE,
we get NO-OCC ∈ PSPACE.
(2) S ∈ NPSPACE.
S consists of checking the existence of a sequence σ, fireable from the initial mark-
ing, that is neither a large step nor can be extended to it. For this we guess a
sequence σ step by step that does not end with the final atom. Then we con-
sider the marking x reached by the occurrence of σ. Clearly, we have σ ∈ S iff
x ∈ NO-OCC. So it suffices to apply our deterministic polynomial-space algorithm
for NO-OCC (see (1)).
(3) S ∈ PSPACE.
Follows from (2) and NPSPACE=PSPACE=co-PSPACE.
The soundness problem is PSPACE-hard.
For PSPACE-hardness, we reduce the problem of deciding if a deterministic linearly
bounded automaton (DLBA) recognizes an input to the soundness problem. Let A =
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(Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) be a DLBA, and consider an input w = a1 . . . ak ∈ Σ∗. The construction is
very similar to that of [Esp96] for proving PSPACE-hardness of the reachability problem
for 1-safe Petri nets, and so we do not provide all details. The negotiation NA has a
control agent C, a head agent H, and a cell agent Ti for every tape cell (i.e., 1 ≤ i ≤ k).
All agents have only one internal state, i.e., the internal states are irrelevant. The
negotiation has an atom n[q, h, a] (with only one result) for every state q, every head
position 1 ≤ h ≤ k, and every a ∈ Σ, plus an initial atom n0 and a final atom nf .
The parties of n[q, h, a] are C, H, and Th. The transition function X is defined so that
NA simulates A in the following sense: If A is currently in state q with the head at
position h, and the contents of the tape are b1 . . . bk, then the current marking x of the
negotiation satisfies the following properties:
• if q 6= qf , then x(C) is the set of atoms n[h′, q′, a] such that q′ = q, and both h′
and a are arbitrary; if q = qf , then x(C) = {nf};
• x(H) is the set of atoms n[h′, q′, a] such that h′ = h and q′, a are arbitrary, plus
the final atom;
• x(Ti) is the set of atoms n[h′, q′, a] such that h′ = i, q′ is arbitrary, and a = bi,
plus the final atom.
Intuitively, agent C is only ready to engage in atoms for the state q; agent H is only
ready to engage in atoms for the position h; and Th is only ready to engage in atoms for
the letter bh. These properties guarantee that the only atom enabled by x is n[h, q, bh] if
q 6= qf , or the atom nf if q = qf . So the negotiation NA has only one initial occurrence
sequence, which corresponds to the execution of A on w.
It remains to define X so that it satisfies these properties. For the initial atom we take
(recall that the input of the DLBA A is the word w = a1 . . . ak):
X(n0, C, step) = {n[h′, q0, a′] | 1 ≤ h′ ≤ k, a′ ∈ Σ}
X(n0, H, step) = {n[1, q′, a′] | q′ ∈ Q, a′ ∈ Σ}
X(n0, Ti, step) = {n[i, q0, ai]}
For the transition function of an atom n[q, h, a] we must consider the three possible
cases of the transition relation (head moves to the right, to the left, or stays put).
We only deal with the case in which the machine moves to the right, the others being
analogous. Assume δ(q, a) = (qˆ, aˆ, R). Then we take
X(n[h, q, a], C, step) = {n[h′, qˆ, a′] | 1 ≤ h′ ≤ k, a′ ∈ Σ}
X(n[h, q, a], H, step) = {n[h+ 1, q′, a′] | q′ ∈ Q, a′ ∈ Σ}
X(n[h, q, a], Th, step) = {n[h, q′, aˆ] | q′ ∈ Q}
Since A is deterministic, NA has only one maximal occurrence sequence, which is a
large step iff A accepts. So NA is sound iff A accepts.
The soundness problem for acyclic negotiations is in DP.
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We first observe that no occurrence of an acyclic negotiation contains an atom more than
once (loosely speaking, once the tokens of the parties of the atom have “passed” beyond
it, they cannot return). It follows that the length of an occurrence sequence is at most
equal to the number of atoms. It also follows that there are no livelocks, but there may
be deadlocks. To check soundness we must check that (1) every atom can be enabled,
and that (2) every occurrence sequence can be extended to a large step. Checking (1)
can be done by guessing in polynomial time enabling sequences for all atoms, and so
(1) is in NP. Checking the negation of (2) can be done by guessing in polynomial time
an occurrence sequence that cannot be extended to a large step because it leads to a
deadlock, and so (2) is in coNP. So the conjunction of (1) and (2) is in DP.
The soundness problem for acyclic negotiations is co-NP-hard.
We reduce 3-CNF-UNSAT to soundness. Given a boolean formula φ with variables xi,
1 ≤ i ≤ n and clauses cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we construct a negotiation Nφ with an agent
Xi for each xi, and an agent J (for judge). W.l.o.g. we assume that no clause of φ is
a tautology. For each variable xi, Nφ has an atom Set x i with Xi as only party and
results true and false. For each clause cj , the negotiation Nφ has an atom Falsej whose
parties are the variables appearing in cj and the judge J . The atom has only one result
false.
After the initial atom, agentXi engages in Set x i and sets xi to a value b ∈ {true, false}
by choosing the appropriate result. After that, Xi is ready to engage in the atoms
Falsej satisfying the following condition: the clause cj is not made true by setting xi
to b; moreover, it is also ready to engage in the final atom. As a consequence, Falsej
becomes enabled iff the assignment chosen by the Xi’s makes cj false. Finally, after the
occurrence of a Falsej , its parties are only ready to engage in the final atom.
After the initial atom, the judge J is ready to engage in all atoms Falsej , and then, if
any of them occurs, in the final atom.
We argue that Nφ is sound iff φ is unsatisfiable. Notice first that, since by assumption
no clause is a tautology, every Falsej atom is enabled by some occurrence sequence. So
all atoms but perhaps the final atom can be enabled by some sequence. So Ni is sound
iff every occurrence sequence can be extended to a large step, and therefore it suffices
to show that φ is unsatisfiable iff every occurrence sequence of Nφ can be extended to a
large step.
If φ is unsatisfiable then, whatever the assignment determined by the outcome of the
Set x i’s, some clause is false, and so at least one of the Falsej atoms is enabled. After
some Falsej occurs, the final atom becomes enabled, and so the computation can be
extended to a large step.
If φ is satisfiable, then consider an initial occurrence sequence in which the atoms
Set x i occur, and then choose the outcomes corresponding to a satisfying assignment.
This way none of the Falsej atoms become enabled. Moreover, the final atom is not
enabled either, because the judge J is not ready to engage in it. So the occurrence
sequence cannot be extended to a large step.
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B. Appendix: A Lemma on Irreducible Acyclic Negotiations
Lemma 35. Let N be an irreducible sound and deterministic acyclic negotiation and
let n 6= nf be an atom of N with more than one result. Then every agent participates
in n.
Proof. We proceed in two steps.
(a) The atom n has a result r such that either (n, r) unconditionally enables nf , or (n, r)
unconditionally enables some atom with more than one result.
We first prove a preliminary claim: if some outcome (n, r) unconditionally enables
some atom, then (a) holds. Indeed: if (n, r) unconditionally enables some atom n′, then
either n′ = nf or n′ has more than one result, because otherwise the d-shortcut rule can
be applied to n and n′, contradicting the irreducibility of N. This proves the claim.
It remains to show that some outcome (n, r) unconditionally enables some atom. For
this, we assume the contrary, and prove that N contains a cycle, contradicting that N is
acyclic.
Since the merge rule is not applicable to N, the atom n has two results r1, r2 such
that X(n, a, r1) 6= X(n, p, r2) for some party a. We proceed in three steps.
(a1) For every reachable marking x that enables n there is a sequence σ such that
x
(n,r1)σ−−−−−→ x1 and x (n,r2)σ−−−−−→ x2 for some markings x1,x2 such that the sets N1 and N2
of atoms enabled by x1,x2 are nonempty and disjoint.
Let σ be a longest occurrence sequence such that x
(n,r1)σ−−−−−→ x1 and x (n,r2)σ−−−−−→ x2 for
some markings x1,x2 (notice that σ exists, because all occurrence sequences of N are
finite by acyclicity). We have N1 ∩ N2 = ∅, because otherwise we can extend σ with
the occurrence of any atom enabled by both markings. We prove that, furthermore,
N1 6= ∅ 6= N2. Assume w.l.o.g. N1 = ∅. Then, since N is sound, we have x1 = xf , which
means that the last step of σ is of the form (nf , rf ). So x2 is also a marking obtained
after the occurrence of (nf , rf ). Since every agent participates in nf and X(nf , p, rf ) = ∅
for every agent p and result rf , we also have x2 = xf . So x
(n,r1)−−−→ x′1 σ−→ xf and
x
(n,r1)−−−→ x′2 σ−→ xf , which implies x′1 = x′2. Since N is deterministic, we then have
X(n, p, r1) = X(n, p, r2), contradicting the hypothesis.
(a2) For every n1 ∈ N1 there is a path leading from some n2 ∈ N2 to n1, and for every
n2 ∈ N2 there is a path leading from some n1 ∈ N1 to n2.
By symmetry it suffices to prove the first part. Since N1 and N2 are disjoint, n1 is
enabled at x1 but not at x2. Moreover, since N is acyclic, every atom can occur at
most once in an occurrence sequence, and so neither n1 nor n2 appear in σ. Since,
furthermore, the sequences (n, r1)σ and (n, r2)σ only differ in their first element, there
is an agent p such that X(n, p, r1) = {n1} and X(n, p, r2) = {n′2} for some n′2 6= n1
(n′2 is not necessarily the n2 ∈ N2 we are looking for). So we have x1(p) = {n1} and
x2(p) = {n′2} (see Figure 27).
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Figure 27: Illustration of the proof of Lemma 35.
We first show that there is a path from n′2 to n1. By assumption, no outcome of n
unconditionally enables any atom, and so (n, r1) does not unconditionally enable n1. So
n1 has a participant q 6= p such that either q is not a participant of n or X(n, q, r1) 6= n1.
Since x1 enables n1 we have x1(q) = {n1}, and since q is not a participant of n or
X(n, q, r1) 6= n1, we have x2(q) = {n1} as well. Since x2(q) = n1, and N is a sound and
deterministic acyclic negotiation, there is an occurrence sequence τ such that x2
τ−→ x′2
and x′2 enables n1 (intuitively, the white token on the arc to the q-port can only leave
the arc through the occurrence of n1). Since x2(p) = {n′2} 6= {n1}, there is a path from
n′2 to n1 (intuitively, the white token on the arc leading to the p-port of n′2 has to travel
to some arc leading to the p-port of n1, and by determinism it can only do so through
a path of p-ports that crosses n′2).
We now prove that there is a path from some n2 ∈ N2 to n′2. If n′2 is enabled at x2,
then n′2 ∈ N2 and we are done. If n′2 is not enabled at x2 (as in the figure), then, since
x2(p) = {n′2} and N is a sound and deterministic acyclic negotiation, there is a sequence
τ such that x2
τ−→ x′2 and x′2 enables n′2 (again, by soundness the white token on the arc
to the p-port of n′2 can eventually leave the arc to move towards nf , and by determinacy
it can only leave the arc through the occurrence of n′2). Since N2 is the set of transitions
enabled at x2, we have τ = (n2, r) τ
′ for some n2 ∈ N2. So some subword of τ is a path
from some transition of N2 to n
′
2.
(a3) N contains a cycle.
Follows immediately from (a2) and the finiteness of N1 and N2.
(b) Every agent participates in n.
By repeated application of (a) we find a chain (n1, r1) . . . (nk, rk) such that n1 = n,
nk = nf , and (ni, ri) unconditionally enables ni+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. By the definition
of an unconditionally enabled atom we have P1 ⊇ P2 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Pk = Pf . Since Pf = A,
we obtain P1 = A.
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C. Appendix: Unique Targets of Maximal Sequences
The proof of Proposition 45 is very involved, and requires some preliminaries. In Section
C.1 we introduce the notions of loop of a negotiation, and synchronizer of a loop. Loosely
speaking, a loop is an occurrence sequence leading from a marking to itself, and a
synchronizer of a loop is an atom having as parties all the agents that participate in any
of the atoms of the loop. We prove a fundamental result stating that every loop of a
sound deterministic negotiation has a synchronizer (Proposition 62). In Section C.1 we
use this result to prove Proposition 68, stating that every cycle of a negotiation has a
dominating atom: An atom having as parties all the agents that participate in any of
the atoms of the cycle.
Equipped with these propositions, in Section C.3 we proceed to prove Proposition 45.
C.1. Loops and Synchronizers
Intuitively, a loop is an occurrence sequence leading back to the marking from which it
started.
Definition 60. A loop of a negotiation N is a nonempty sequence σ of outcomes such
that x
σ−→ x for some marking x of N. We say that x enables σ. Given a loop σ,
we denote Nσ the set of atoms of N that appear in σ, and Aσ the set of agents that
participate in at least one of these atoms. A loop σ is minimal if no loop σ′ satisfies
Nσ′ ⊂ Nσ.
The sequences
σ1 = (n1, a) (n2, a) (n4, b) (n5, a)
σ2 = (n6, a) (n7, b)
σ3 = (n1, b) (n3, a) (n4, c) (n3, a) (n4, b) (n5, a)
are loops of the negotiation of Figure 21. We have Nσ3 = {n1, n3, n4, n5}. Numbering
the agents of the negotiation from left to right, the set Aσ2 contains only the third agent,
while Aσ1 and Aσ3 contain the first and second agents.
Definition 61. Let σ be a loop of a negotiation. An atom n ∈ Nσ is a synchronizer of
σ if P ′n ⊆ Pn for every atom n′ ∈ Nσ. We say that σ is synchronized by n. An atom is
a synchronizer if it synchronizes at least one loop of N.
The loop σ1 above is synchronized by n1 and n4, but not by n2 or n6. The atoms
n1, n3, n4, n6, n7 are synchronizers of the negotiation, while n0, n2, n5, n8, and nf are
not. Indeed, the atoms n0, n8, and nf do not belong to any loop. Atoms n2 and n5 do
belong to loops, but only to loops that contain atoms with strictly more parties.
We prove two important properties of a sound cyclic deterministic negotiation N: Such
a negotiation always has at least one loop, and every loop has at least one synchronizer.
Proposition 62. Every sound cyclic deterministic negotiation has a loop.
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Proof. Let pi be a cycle of the graph of a sound deterministic negotiation N. Let n1
be an arbitrary atom occurring in pi, and let n2 be its successor in pi. Observe that
n1 6= nf because nf has no successor, and hence no cycle contains nf . By soundness
some reachable marking x1 enables n1, and so n2 ∈ X(n1, p, r) for at least one party p
and one result r. By determinism, we have n2 ∈ X(n1, p, r) = {n2}. Let x1 (n1,r)−−−→ x′1.
Again by soundness, some occurrence sequence leads from from x′1 to the final marking.
This sequence must contain an occurrence of n2, because this is the only atom agent p
is ready to engage in. In particular, some prefix of this sequence leads to a marking x2
that enables n2.
Repeating this argument for the nodes n1, n2, n3, . . . , nk = n1 of the cycle pi, we con-
clude that N has an infinite occurrence sequence containing infinitely many occurrences
of atoms of pi. Since the set of reachable markings is finite, this sequence contains a
loop.
Now we prove that every minimal loop has a synchronizer. We start with a technical
lemma. Intuitively, it states that firing an outcome of a loop σ never decreases the set
of agents ready to engage in atoms of Nσ.
Lemma 63. Let σ be a loop of a negotiation, let (n, r) be an outcome appearing in
σ, and let x1,x2 be arbitrary markings such that x1
(n,r)−−−→ x2. For every agent p: if
x1(p) ∩Nσ 6= ∅, then x2(p) ∩Nσ 6= ∅.
Proof. Let x1
(n,r)−−−→ x2 and assume x1(p) ∩Nσ 6= ∅. If p does not participate in n, then
x1(p) = x2(p), and so x2(p) ∩Nσ 6= ∅. So assume that p participates in n. Then, since
x1
(n,r)−−−→ x2, we have n ∈ x1(p). By the definition of a loop, there is a sequence τ and
reachable markings x,x′ such that x
(n,r)−−−→ x′ τ−→ x (the sequence (n, r) τ is a circular
permutation of σ). Since we have x2(p) = x
′(p), it suffices to show x′(p) ∩ Nσ 6= ∅. If
n ∈ x′(p), then we are done. If n /∈ x′(p) then, since n ∈ x(p) and x′ τ−→ x, the sequence
τ contains an outcome (n′, r′) such that n′ ∈ x′(p). Since, by definition, only atoms of
Nσ occur in τ , we have n
′ ∈ Nσ, and so x′(p) ∩Nσ 6= ∅.
Proposition 64. Every minimal loop of a sound deterministic negotiation is synchro-
nized by at least one of its atoms.
Proof. Let σ be a minimal loop enabled at a reachable marking x. Since N is sound,
there is an occurrence sequence x
σf−→ xf . Let σf = (n1, r1) . . . , (nk, rk). Choose an
arbitrary agent pˆ of Aσ, and let nj0 be the atom of Nσ with pˆ as party that appears last
in σf , i.e. nj0 ∈ Nσ and nj0+1, . . . , nk /∈ Nσ. We claim that nj0 is a synchronizer of σ.
We iteratively construct a path pi of the graph of N containing only atoms having pˆ as
party. The first atom of the path is nj0 . Assume now that the path we have constructed
so far is (nj0 , pˆ, r0) (nj1 , pˆ, r1) . . . (nji , pˆ, ri) for some j0 < j1 < · · · < ji. We choose nji+1
as the last occurrence in σf of an atom that has pˆ as party and is a successor of nji ,
meaning that {nji+1} = X(nji , pˆ, ri) for some result ri. This guarantees that the only
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atom of pi that belongs to Nσ is nj0 , and that all atoms of pi are distinct. Since all agents
participate in nf the path ends with nf .
In the rest of the proof we rename nj0 as npi. Since x enables the loop σ and since
npi ∈ Nσ, after some prefix of σ a marking xpi is reached which enables npi. The loop
σ continues with some outcome (npi, r1), where r1 is one possible result of npi. By
construction of pi, there is another result r2 of npi such that X(npi, pˆ, r2) is the second
atom of pi, and this atom does not belong to Nσ.
Let x′pi be the marking such that xpi
(npi ,r2)−−−−→ x′pi. We iteratively construct an occurrence
sequence enabled at x′pi as follows. Let τ be the sequence constructed so far and let x
be the marking reached by τ (initially τ =  and x = x′pi):
(0) If x is the final marking, stop.
(1) Else, if x enables an atom n of Nσ, then at least one outcome (n, r) occurs in σ.
Let τ := τ (n, r).
(2) Else, if x enables an atom n of pi, then let r be the result such that X(n, pˆ, r) is
the successor of n in pi. Let τ := τ (n, r).
(3) Else, let ρ be a shortest occurrence sequence that either leads to the final marking
or enables an atom that appears in σ, or enables an atom that appears in pi (so that
after this sequence either (1) or (2) can be applied). Such an occurrence sequence
exists because N is sound. Further, ρ is not empty because otherwise we would
have taken branch (0). Let τ := τρ.
For the rest of the proof let τ be the sequence generated by this procedure. We claim
that τ is finite (i.e., that the procedure terminates) and leads to the final marking. For
this we prove that the procedure takes branches (1)-(3) only finitely often.
We first prove that the procedure takes branch (2) only finitely often. Since every
time (2) is taken τ is extended with an outcome of an atom of pi, it suffices to show
that these atoms occur only finitely often in τ . Recall that pi is a finite path ending
with nf , and that all atoms of pi involve pˆ. Let pi = (n1, aˆ, r1) (n2, aˆ, r2) . . . (nk, pˆ, rk),
where nk = nf . By determinism, pˆ is always ready to engage in at most one atom of pi.
By construction, after the i-th occurrence in τ of an atom of pi the agent pˆ is ready to
engage in ni+1. Therefore, the atoms of pi occur at most k times in τ
We now prove that the procedure takes branch (3) only finitely often. Since branch
(2) is taken only finitely often, some suffix τ ′ of τ does not contain any occurrence of
atoms of pi. For every marking x reached along the execution of τ ′, let Aσ(x) be the
set of agents p such that x(p) ∈ Nσ (that is, the agents that at x are ready to engage
in an atom of Nσ). We show that along the execution of τ
′ these sets never decrease,
and strictly increase each time the procedure takes branch (3); since the set of agents is
finite, this concludes the proof.
Let x1 be a marking of τ
′ at which the procedure chooses either branch (1) or branch
(3). If the procedure takes branch (1), then, by the definition of (1), the procedure
selects a result (n, r) that occurs in σ, and extends the current sequence with the step
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x1
(n,r)−−−→ x2. By Lemma 63 we have Aσ(x1) ⊆ Aσ(x2). If the procedure takes branch
(3), then the current sequence is extended with a shortest sequence x1
(n1,r1)−−−−→ x2 (n2,r2)−−−−→
· · · (nk−1,rk−1)−−−−−−−→ xk such that {n1, . . . , nk} ∩ Nσ = ∅, and xk enables an atom of Nσ or
an atom of pi. By determinism, and since {n1, . . . , nk} ∩ Nσ = ∅, we have Aσ(x1) ⊆
Aσ(x2) ⊆ · · · ⊆ Aσ(xk). Since xk enables an atom of Nσ or an atom of pi, but no atom
of pi occurs in τ ′, the marking xk enables an atom of Nσ and, since the sequence is a
shortest one, xk−1 does not enable any atom of Nσ. So there is an agent p ∈ Aσ such
that x1(p) /∈ Nσ and xk(p) ∈ Nσ, which proves Aσ(x1) ⊂ Aσ(xk), and we are done.
Finally, we prove that the procedure takes branch (1) only finitely often. Since
branches (2) and (3) are taken only finitely often, from some point on the algorithm
only takes branch (1) (if at all), and so some suffix τ ′′ of τ contains only outcomes of
Aσ. Let pˆ be the agent of Aσ we used for the construction of pi. Since all the atoms of pi
have already been executed before reaching τ ′′, no atom of Nσ in which pˆ participates,
and in particular the atom npi, can occur in τ
′′. So all the atoms occurring in τ ′′ belong
to Nσ \ {npi}. Assume τ ′′ is infinite. Then, since the number of reachable markings is
finite, Nσ \ {npi} contains a loop (more precisely, there is a loop in which only atoms
of Nσ \ {npi} occur). But this contradicts the minimality of σ. So τ ′′ is finite, which
concludes the proof of the claim.
By the claim, the procedure constructs a sequence τ reaching the final marking. Since
the final atom involves all agents, no agent was able to remain in the loop. In other
words: all agents of Aσ left the loop when (npi, r2) has occurred. As a consequence, all
these agents are parties of npi, and so npi is a synchronizer of the loop σ.
C.2. Dominating Atoms
Loosely speaking, an atom n of a path of a negotiation dominates the path if every agent
that participates in some atom of the path also participates in n.
Definition 65. Let N be a negotiation and let pi = (n1, p1, r1) (n2, p2, r2) · · · (nk, pk, rk)
be a path of N. An atom ni dominates pi if Pnj ⊆ Pni for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
We prove that every circuit of a sound deterministic negotiation has a dominating
atom. This result is a syntactic counterpart to Proposition 64, stating that every loop
has a synchronizer. Indeed, a loop can be seen as a circuit in the marking graph of the
negotiation. The proof shows that every circuit can be “executed”, meaning that one
can find an arbitrarily long occurrence sequence that executes the outcomes of the circuit
arbitrarily often, and never executes any other outcome of the atoms in the circuit.
Definition 66. Let pi = (n1, p1, r1) (n2, p2, r2) · · · (nk, pk, rk) be a path of a negotiation.
An execution of pi is an occurrence sequence x
σ−→ x′ such that x is a reachable marking,
σ = σ0(n1, r1)σ1 (n2, r2)σ2 · · ·σk−1 (nk, rk), and for every atom n of pi, if (n, r) occurs
in σ then (n, p, r) occurs in pi.
A path pi of N is executable if it has an execution x
σ−→ x′.
Lemma 67. Every path of a sound deterministic negotiation is executable.
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Proof. Let N be a sound deterministic negotiation, and let pi = (n1, p1, r1) · · · (nk, pk, rk)
be a path of N.
We construct a sequence σ that executes pi, by induction on k. If k = 1 then, by
soundness, some reachable marking enables n1, and so we can take σ = (n1, r1). If k > 1
then, by induction hypothesis, there exists a reachable marking x and an occurrence
sequence σ′ that executes pi′ = (n1, p1, r1) · · · (nk−1, pk−1, rk−1). Let x σ
′−→ x′. Since N
is sound, there exists an occurrence sequence x′ τ−→ xf . Since N is deterministic and
nk ∈ X(ni, ak−1, rk−1), we have X(nk−1, pk−1, rk−1) = {nk}, and so x′(pk−1) = {nk}.
Since xf (pk−1) = ∅, we have τ = τ ′ (n, r) τ ′′ for some sequence τ ′ that contains any
atom having pk−1 as party and some atom n such that pk−1 ∈ Pn. Let x′ σ
′−→ x′′. We
have x′′(pk−1) = x′(pk−1) = {n1}, and so n = nk. So we can take σ = σ′ τ ′ (nk, rk).
Proposition 68. Every cycle of a sound deterministic negotiation has a dominating
atom.
Proof. Let N be a sound deterministic negotiation and let pi = (n1, p1, r1) · · · (nk, pk, rk)
be a cycle of N. Then pii (the result of concatenating i copies of pi) is a path of N for
every i ≥ 1. By Lemma 67, pii is executable for every i > 1, and so for every number
` there is a firing sequence containing at least ` occurrences of each of the outcomes
(n1, r1), . . . , (nk, rk), and no occurrence of any other outcome of the atoms n1, . . . , nk.
Since N has only finitely many reachable markings, we can extract from the firing se-
quence for a sufficiently large ` a loop x
σ−→ x of N containing all of (n1, r1), . . . , (nk, rk),
and no other outcome of n1, . . . , nk. By Proposition 64, σ has a synchronizer n.
We claim that n = ni for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, which proves the proposition. Assume the
contrary, and let y be a marking of the loop that enables n. Since n is a synchronizer,
we have y(p) = {n} for every party p of n1, . . . , nk. Let x (ni,ri)−−−−→ x′ τ−→ y be the
unique segment of the loop such that no outcome of pi occurs in τ . Since (ni, ri) is
the only outcome of ni that appears in σ, no outcome of ni appears in τ . Since N is
deterministic, we have x′(p) = y(p) for every party p of ni. But, by the definition of
the cycle pi, we have x′(pi) = {ni+1}. So we get {ni+1} = x′(pi) = y(pi) = {n}, which
implies n = ni+1.
C.3. Proof of Proposition 45
We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 69. Let N be a sound deterministic negotiation with a set of agents A. Let
B,C be a partition of A, i.e., A = B ∪ C and B ∩ C = ∅. Let x1,x2 be two reachable
markings such that
• x1(B) = x2(B), and
• every atom enabled at x1 or x2 has at least one party in B, and at least one party
in C.
Then x1(C) = x2(C).
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the size of C. If |C| = 0 then there is nothing to
show. So assume |C| > 0. For i = 1, 2 let Ni be the set of atoms enabled at xi, and let
Bi be the set of agents participating in some atom of Ni.
Claim 1: N1 ∩N2 6= ∅.
We show that if N1 ∩ N2 = ∅ then N contains a cycle without a dominating atom,
contradicting Proposition 68. Let n1 ∈ N1. By soundness, there is a shortest sequence
x2
σ−→ x′2 such that x′2 enables n1. We prove two subclaims.
Claim 1a: No atom of σ dominates n1.
Since n1 is enabled at x1 and at least one of its parties belongs toB, we have x1(b) = {n1}
for some agent b ∈ B, and so, by the definition of B, also x2(b) = {n1}. Since σ is
shortest, it does not contain any occurrence of n1. So, since N is deterministic, we also
have y(b) = {n1} for every intermediate marking y reached during the execution of σ.
It follows that b does not participate in any atom occurring in σ. So no atom of σ
dominates n1.
Claim 1b: There exists m0 ∈ N2 and a path pi = (m0, p0, r0) . . . (mk, pk, rk) such that
X(mk, pk, rk) = {n1} and none of m0, . . . ,mk dominates n1.
By Claim 1, it suffices to construct a path such that m0 ∈ N2, X(mk, pk, rk) = {n1},
and all of m0, . . . ,mk occur in σ. Let σ = (n, r)σ
′. We proceed by induction on the
length of σ.
If |σ| = 1 then σ = (n, r), and so x2 (n,r)−−−→ x′2. Since x2 does not enable n1 but x′2 does,
we have X(n, p, r) = {n1} for some p ∈ Pn. Choose pi = (n, p, r). Since n is enabled at
x2, we have n ∈ N2, and we are done.
If |σ| > 1, let y be the marking given by x2 (n,r)−−−→ y σ
′−→ x′2. Then σ′ is a shortest
sequence enabling n1 from y and so, by induction hypothesis, there is a path pi
′ =
(m1, p1, r1) · · · (mk, pk, rk) such that m1 is enabled at y, X(mk, pk, rk) = {n1} and all of
m1, . . . ,mk occur in σ
′. If m1 ∈ N2 then we can take pi := pi′. If m1 /∈ N2, then m1 is not
enabled at x2. Since m1 is enabled at y, we have x2(p) = {n} and y(p) = {m1} for some
party p of both n and m0. It follows X(n, p, r) = {m1}. So we can take pi = (n, p, r)pi′,
which concludes the proof.
Observe that Claim 1b holds for every atom of N1. By symmetry, for every n2 ∈ N2
there is m0 ∈ N1 and a path pi = (m0, p0, r0) . . . (mk, pk, rk) such that X(mk, pk, rk) =
{n2} and none of m0, . . . ,mk dominates n2. Since N has only finitely many atoms,
there are n11, . . . , n1k ∈ N1, n21, . . . , n2k ∈ N2 and a cycle that visits the sequence of
atoms n11, n21, n12, n22, . . . , n1k, n2k in that order, and such that no atom of the cycle
dominates all others. So the cycle does not contain a dominating atom, contradicting
Proposition 68. This proves Claim 1.
By Claim 1, there is an atom n ∈ N1∩N2. Let c ∈ C∩Pn, which exists by assumption,
and let B′ = B ∪ {c} and C ′ = C \ {c}. Since n is enabled at x1 and x2 we have
x1(c) = {n} = x2(c). Since |C ′| = |C| − 1 we can apply the induction hypothesis to B′
and C ′. So we have x1(C ′) = x2(C ′), and therefore x1(C) = x2(C).
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We are now ready to prove that all maximal n-sequences have the same target, and
that the same holds for maximal strict (n, r)-sequences.
Proposition 45. Let N be a sound and deterministic negotiation, and let n be an atom
of N.
(a) All maximal n-sequences have the same target.
That is: there is a unique marking x such that xn
σ−→ x for every maximal n-
sequence σ. We call x the target of n.
(b) For every outcome (n, r), all maximal strict (n, r)-sequences have the same target.
That is: there is a unique marking x such that xn
σ−→ x for every maximal strict
(n, r)-sequence σ. We call x the target of (n, r).
Proof. (a) Let σ1 and σ2 be two maximal Pn-sequences and x0
σ−→ y be an occurrence
sequence that enables n for the first time. We then have
x0
σ−→ y σ1−→ x1 and x0 σ−→ y σ2−→ x2
for two markings x1,x2 such that x1(a) = x2(a) for every a /∈ Pn. By the maximality
of σ1 and σ2, neither x1 nor x2 enable any atom n
′ such that Pn′ ⊆ Pn
We prove x1 = x2, which shows that σ1 and σ2 have the same target. Let B,C be
the partition of the agents of N defined by p ∈ B iff x1(p) = x2(p). We have C ⊆ Pn.
By soundness there exists a firing sequence x1
ρ−→ xf . Let τ be the longest B-prefix of
ρ, and let x1
τ−→ x′1. Since x1(B) = x2(B) (meaning x1(p) = x2(p) for every p ∈ B), we
have x2
τ−→ x′2 for some marking x′2 such that x′1(B) = x′2(B).
Let n′ be an atom enabled at x′1. We claim that Pn′ intersects both B and C. Since
B,C is a partition, it suffices to show that Pn′ is not contained in B and is not contained
in C. That Pn′ is not contained in B follows from the maximality of τ . Assume Pn′ ⊆ C.
Since C ⊆ Pn we get Pn′ ⊆ Pn. Since τ does not contain any atom with a party in C,
we have x′1(C) = x1(C), and so n′ is also enabled at x1, contradicting the maximality
of σ1. This proves the claim.
So every atom enabled at x′1 has parties in both B and C. By symmetry, the same
holds for x′2. Since x′1(B) = x′2(C) we can apply Lemma 69 and conclude x′1 = x′2.
Since x′1 and x′2 are reached from x1 and x2 by means of the same sequence τ , we get
x1 = x2.
(b) The proof is exactly as in (a). In this case we even have C ⊂ Pn
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